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Abstract: 
 
This article explores the question whether lawyers should be able to argue 
both sides of a legal issue is unrelated cases. Today the ABA and many 
state bar associations caution against so-called “positional conflicts,” 
analyzing them as potential conflicts of interest under a multi-factor test.  
This relatively recent concern misses the real potential for harm: it is 
precisely when a lawyer decides not to make a contradictory argument for 
one client in order not to offend or harm another client that an ethical 
problem is likely to be present. A positional conflict is therefore evidence 
that any pressure to modify arguments has been overcome. In fact, a rule 
against positional conflicts only increases lawyers’ incentives to modify or 
drop arguments for the less-favored client.  Thus, there should be no 
ethical prohibition against positional conflicts. On the other hand, a 
positional conflict may create credibility problems, despite the widely held 
professional ideals of independence and detachment. The positional 
conflict debate exposes fundamental ambivalence about lawyer sincerity, 
loyalty and independence. Eliminating a rule against positional conflicts 
will to some extent mitigate those credibility problems, but not entirely.  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 “A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds.” 2
“But it was my view that lawyers don't stand in the shoes of their clients and that 
good lawyers can give advice and argue any side of a case.” 3
Anyone who has observed a law school moot court competition knows that a lawyer can   
argue both sides of an issue, and even argue both sides extremely well. In a moot court 
competition, teams of law students proceed through the contest arguing first one side, 
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2then the other, of a case.  Often these contradictory arguments are within hours of each 
other.  The contestants suffer no loss of credibility for their side-switching. 
 
In the practice of law, of course, conflict of interest rules prevent lawyers from being on 
both sides of the same case.  But should lawyers be allowed to take contradictory legal 
positions in unrelated cases?  Although there is concern about such “positional conflicts” 
today, in 1872 the answer was yes.  Lawyer and Senator Matthew Hale Carpenter argued 
contradictory interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities 
clause to the Supreme Court in two famous cases. Carpenter represented a woman denied 
admission to the bar in Bradwell v. Illinois4and in the Slaughter-House Cases5 he  argued 
for the state of Louisiana, defending its grant of a butchering monopoly.  In Bradwell,
Carpenter argued that the privileges and immunities clause protected his client’s right to 
pursue an avocation in law. In the Slaughterhouse Cases, he argued that the clause did 
not protect a citizen’s right to work in the butchering industry, and did not limit the 
state’s authority to restrict admission into particular avocations.6 The arguments were 
 
4 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130(1873). 
5 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
6 Senator Hale argued first in the Bradwell case that the “privileges and immunities” protected by the 14th 
amendment (then only 5 years old) included the right to pursue all avocations.  While he conceded the state 
had the authority to prescribe qualifications for a profession, he argued that it could not exclude an entire 
class of citizens from any avocation.  21 L.Ed. 2d 442, 444. (The Lawyer’s Edition reporter of the Supreme 
Court decisions includes the arguments of counsel). “I maintain that the 14th Amendment opens to every 
citizen of the United States, male or female, black or white, married or single, the honorable professions as 
well as the servile employments of life; and that no citizen can be excluded form any; one of them.” Id. 
 Yet in the Slaughterhouse cases, only two weeks later, he argued that the privileges and 
immunities clause of the 14th Amendment did not impair the authority of Louisiana to grant one company 
the exclusive right to sell and butcher animals for food in a certain area.  Hale argued, “The privileges and 
immunities here contemplated are those which are fundamental, as, for instance the right of going into any 
state for the purpose of residing therein; the right of taking up one’s residence therein, and becoming a 
citizen; the right of free entrance and exit, and passage through; the protection of the laws affecting 
personal liberty.”  21 L.Ed. 394, 402. 
 The conflict seems clear.  In maintaining in Bradwell that the privileges and immunities protected 
by the 14th Amendment included professions and avocations, he undermined the argument that the state 
had the authority to exclude certain citizens from the avocation of butchering.  In addition, Hale’s 
eagerness to show that the court could decide for Bradwell without granting women the right to vote ended 
up cutting against his argument in the Slaughterhouse cases that the privileges and immunities of the 14th 
Amendment included only those that were “fundamental” such as the right to travel. (Surely the right to 
vote is a fundamental privilege of citizenship). One can imagine ways to reconcile the arguments in the two 
cases, but the need for such reconciliation is further evidence of the conflict.  At any rate, the conflict was 
made even clearer when Hale won the Slaughterhouse Cases, but lost Bradwell, and when the decision in 
Bradwell cited heavily his victory in the Slaughterhouse Cases.   
3within weeks of each other.  Carpenter prevailed in the Slaughterhouse Cases but lost in 
Bradwell. The Bradwell decision relied almost exclusively on the precedent set in the 
Slaughter-House Cases one day earlier.7
Carpenter’s contradictory legal positions before the same court were not seen as an 
ethical problem at the time; in fact, the cases brought him fame and a thriving Supreme 
Court practice.8 Carpenter’s actions were consistent with the lawyerly ideals of 
independence, detachment and professionalism.  Yet under the rules prevalent in most 
American jurisdictions today, Carpenter’s dual representations would be seen as a 
conflict of interest and therefore an ethical violation.   
 
Since an ethical concern with legal positional conflicts was raised in the 1983 comments 
to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, legal authorities have analyzed 
positional conflicts as potential conflicts of interest. According to most authorities today, 
a positional conflict is not a per se ethical violation, but may become a conflict of interest 
if the issue is important enough to the clients and there is a risk that one representation 
will materially limit the other; for example, by leading to precedent from one case that 
will adversely control the other (as was true with Senator Carpenter’s cases).9
Positional conflicts are rarely the subject of litigation and there are few published cases 
on the subject.  It is the author’s belief that lawyers suppress most positional conflicts and 
that business conflicts are the greater force.   Business conflicts are not necessarily ethical 
code violations, but the term used to describe economic pressures lawyers face to favor 
one case over another. For example, one client may provide repeat business so that a 
 
Hale was paid for his representation in the Slaughterhouse cases, but took on Myra Bradwell’s 
case pro bono.  See Jane M. Friedman, Myra Bradwell: On Defying the Creator and Becoming a Lawyer,
28 VAPPARAISO UNIV. L. REV. 1287, 1293-97 (1994).  
 
7 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1873). 
8 E. BRUCE THOMPSON, MATTHEW HALE CARPENTER: WEBSTER OF THE WEST 103 (1954). “His courage in 
the conduct of a cause was the sublimity of heroism, and his fidelity to his clients was never open to 
suspicion.” MEMORIAL ADDRESSES ON THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF MATTHEW H. CARPENTER 70 
(Washington, Govt. Print. Off., 1882). 
9 See section III, infra.  
4lawyer does not want to offend it by taking on a case or making an argument that client 
disapproves of.   
 
The presence of a positional conflict is actually evidence that a business conflict may 
have been overcome.  It is when a lawyer decides not to make a contrary argument for 
one client in order not to offend or harm another client that an ethical problem is likely to 
be present.  The real ethical concern should be the way in which a lawyer’s interest in, 
loyalty to, or dependence on, a particular client may limit the representation of other 
clients.  Too much focus on a rule against positional conflicts creates incentives for 
lawyers to avoid the positional conflict by bowing to business conflicts and suppressing 
arguments for or dropping the less favored client.  There is some evidence that that is 
exactly what has happened in many law practices, and that evidence may explain why 
there are so few cases raising the question of positional conflicts.  Thus, an ethical rule 
against positional conflicts seems counterproductive.   
 
Even for lawyers who practice without business conflicts, (e.g., public defenders or legal 
services lawyers), a rule against positional conflicts does not help clients.  An excessive 
concern with avoiding positional conflicts in these kinds of cases could lead to 
unnecessary withdrawal of quality counsel, who are generally scarce.10 
At the same time, positional conflicts can raise serious attorney credibility questions. 
Depending on the importance of the issue to both cases, and the proximity of the 
arguments in time and place, the lawyer presenting conflicting legal arguments may face 
credibility problems with clients, the court(s) and the public 
 
Underlying this credibility concern is ambivalence in the profession about lawyer 
sincerity.  According to the traditional “cab rank” view of law practice, a lawyer 
honorably takes the position of whatever client jumps in his cab.11 Under this view, a 
 
10ACLU OF WA REPORT ON INDIGENT DEFENSE (2004), 
http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/indigentdefenserpt.pdf ; Deborah Rhode, Essay: The Pro Bono 
Responsibilities of Lawyers and Law Students, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1563 (2002). 
11 See, e.g., Philadelphia Ethics Opinion 89-27 at 2.  
5lawyer is an independent professional who does not necessarily endorse the viewpoints or 
goals of his or her clients, but nevertheless makes the best arguments possible for them.  
It is this view of the profession that permeates the Model Rules and most legal 
authorities.   
 
But even under the traditional “independent” view of the profession, a positional conflict 
presents credibility problems, suggesting that lawyers and judges hold simultaneous 
contradictory ideas about the lawyer’s role.  Under the traditional view, advocates usually 
choose their positions not because they believe in them but because these positions best 
serve their clients.  We also know that many lawyers would represent either side of a 
controversy and take the first client who approaches them.  Lawyers who do so suffer no 
loss in credibility. Why then should their credibility be diminished if they argue a 
contrary position in an unrelated case? This concern about credibility cannot be simply 
reasoned away—there is something about the lawyer’s performance that demands at least 
a semblance of loyalty to the argument.  A lawyer who argues on both sides of an issue 
may have difficulty establishing a persuasive character or ethos. Nevertheless, 
eliminating an ethical rule against positional conflicts, and making clear that a lawyer can 
argue both sides of a question ethically, will greatly reduce these credibility problems. 
 
This article argues that a legal positional conflict is not a true conflict of interest, and 
should not be the subject of an ethical prohibition.  Because of the incentives it creates, a 
rule against positional conflicts simply gives greater control to wealthy clients over the 
availability of legal services without significantly protecting the rights of poor or middle 
income clients.  Business conflicts already exert significant pressure on lawyers; too 
much concern with potential positional conflicts only increases that pressure.  
 
This article further argues that eliminating an ethical prohibition against positional 
conflicts could mitigate much of the credibility concerns raised by contradictory legal 
arguments.  But even if the profession fully endorsed the ethic of independence and 
eliminated a rule against positional conflicts, some credibility problems would inevitably 
6remain. Thus, while there should be no rule against positional conflicts, a court should 
respect an attorney’s decision to withdraw because of credibility concerns.  
 
Part I of this article defines a legal positional conflict, and explains the distinction 
between legal and factual positional conflicts.  Part II covers the historical evolution of 
the ABA position on positional conflicts while Part III describes the approaches taken by 
the Restatement on the Law of Lawyering, caselaw, state ethics opinions and state ethical 
codes.  Part IV critiques the predominant analysis of positional conflicts as potential 
conflicts of interest, on the grounds that it exacerbates business conflicts and creates 
harmful incentives.  This section also acknowledges the credibility concerns with 
positional conflicts, and illustrates the operation of a positional conflict with the example 
of a public defender.  Part V sets forth a proposal to amend the comments to Model Rule 
1.7. 
 
I. What is a Positional or Issue Conflict? 
 
The American Bar Association defines the question of positional or issue conflicts as 
“whether a lawyer can represent a client with respect to a substantive legal issue when the 
lawyer knows that the client’s position on that issue is directly contrary to the position 
being urged by the lawyer (or the lawyer’s firm) on behalf of another client in a different, 
and unrelated pending matter.”12 A seminal article on the topic states: “A positional 
conflict of interest occurs when a law firm adopts a legal position for one client seeking a 
particular legal result that is directly contrary to the position taken on behalf of another 
present or former client, seeking an opposite legal result, in a completely unrelated 
matter.”13 
In a positional conflict, because the matters and parties are unrelated, there would be no 
conflict of interest but for the contrary arguments the lawyer asserts.14 If a positional 
 
12 ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-377 at 1 (1993). 
13 John S. Dzienkowski, Positional Conflicts of Interest, 71 TEX. L. REV. 457, 460 (1993). 
14 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7(a) provides that a concurrent conflict of interest exists if: 
“(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant 
7conflict is to rise to the level of a conflict of interest, it will be because it creates a 
“significant risk that the representation of [a] client will be materially limited” by the 
lawyer’s opposing arguments in an unrelated matter.15 If there is a conflict of interest, 
then the attorney and the attorney’s firm may not represent both clients, unless the clients 
give reasonable, informed consent.16 If an attorney with a conflict of interest continues 
with both representations absent such consent, he or she may be subject to a 
disqualification motion and/or disciplinary proceedings.17 A conflict of interest may also 
support a malpractice action by showing a breach of the standard of care.18 Thus, whether 
a positional conflict constitutes a conflict of interest under the ethical rules is a critical 
question.   
 
Sometimes lawyers and others use the term “positional conflict” to describe what is really 
a business conflict19 that will never ripen into a positional conflict.  For example, in one 
survey, lawyers in different firms repeatedly used the term to refer to a problem in 
accepting clients or cases that more valuable clients would object to, regardless of 
whether such representation would entail making arguments that actually conflict with 
arguments made on behalf of these valuable clients.20 In  a case that made the front page 
of the New York Times, a large law firm withdrew from pro bono representation of New 
York City against gun manufacturers because of, in the words of a firm statement, 
 
risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities 
to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.” Subsection (1) 
does not apply to a positional conflict because it refers to situations where the attorney is proceeding 
directly against one client on behalf of another client. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 6 
(2004).  
15 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2004). 
16 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(4) (2004). 
17 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 8.4, cmt. 1 (2004). 
18 RONALD D. ROTUNDA, LEGAL ETHICS – THE LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 
1.7-2(b) (American Bar Association, 2002). 
19 A business conflict does not usually rise to the level of an ethical violation.  Business conflicts have been 
defined as “not a properly disqualifying conflict of interest, but merely the risk of loss of business from 
having a firm member be perceived to adopt a policy position that one of the firm's clients might not like.” 
Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U.L. REV. 1, 61-62 (1988) (citing MODEL CODE OF 
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-17 (1981)). Gordon adds, “What is especially interesting about such 
prohibitions is not so much that partners impose them, but that the partners are so unembarrassed about 
doing so, even though the practice violates--in addition to the formal provisions of some codes of ethics--
every conceivable traditional ideal of independence their profession has ever entertained.” Id.
20 Susan P. Shapiro, Everests of the Mundane: Conflict of Interest in Real-World Legal Practice, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1166-1168 (2000) 
8“certain potential ‘positional conflicts’ involving the position of longterm existing clients 
and those being advanced in the gun case.”21 Legal experts commented, however, that 
the firm really faced economic pressure, rather than an ethical problem.22 The firm was 
not actually faced with taking contrary positions, just the disapproval of powerful 
clients.23 Use of the term ‘positional conflict’ to cover business conflicts is confusing, 
and actually lumps together situations where lawyers argue conflicting positions on 
behalf of different clients, and situations where lawyers refuse to make the conflicting 
arguments or suppress the problem for economic reasons.  When the term “positional 
conflict” is used in this article, it refers to the former situation.  Of course, a true 
positional conflict may exist together with—or cause—a business conflict, but it may 
also occur without any significant conflicting economic pressure on the attorney.  
 
This article is concerned with positional conflicts arising from legal, not factual, 
arguments.24 Examples of legal positional conflicts are: arguing for one client that the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines are constitutional, while arguing for another client that the 
Guidelines are unconstitutional;25 arguing that jury recommendations in a capital case are 
entitled to great weight in one case, and arguing in another case that such 
recommendations are not entitled to great weight.26 An example of a factual positional  
conflict is arguing in one case that the United States uranium market is competitive, 
while arguing in another that it is not.27 
21 Top Law Firm Withdraws from City’s Gun Suit, N.Y. Times, April 17, 2004 at A1, A17.   
22 Id. The firm may have wished to make their withdrawal look motivated by ethical rather than business 
considerations. 
23 Another firm in a high-profile case used the term “positional conflict” to describe a situation where one 
client asked the firm to withdraw from a case in which it was appealing to the Supreme Court an appellate 
decision that was favorable precedent for the client in another case in which the firm was not involved. See, 
e.g., Jonathan Ringel, Conflict Gives Bork a Starr Turn: Kirkland & Ellis forced to give up role in Festo,
LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 16, 2001, at 6.  This situation is more accurately labeled a business conflict, since the 
firm was not making conflicting legal arguments, only one argument that another client did not like. 
24 Of course, the line between fact and law is notoriously difficult to draw at times. See, e.g., Randall H. 
Warner, All Mixed Up About Mixed Questions, 7 J. OF APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 101 (2005).   
25 Federal Defenders of San Diego Inc. v. United States Sentencing Commission, infra note 101. 
26 State v. Williams, infra note 96. 
27 See Westinghouse, infra note 90.  The court did not find a factual positional conflict, but ruled on other 
grounds. 
9This article is concerned primarily with legal, rather than factual, positional conflicts 
because a factual positional conflict is more likely to meet the definition of a conflict of 
interest even without a special rule against positional conflicts.  A factual overlap in two 
cases is more likely to mean that the cases are indeed related, 28 will likely involve 
attacking and defending the same evidence and witnesses, and present the danger of 
misusing confidential information from one case to disadvantage that client.29 To the 
extent a factual conflict does not create a clear conflict of interest because of the factual 
overlap, it may raise the same ethical issues as a pure legal positional conflict.  It is 
difficult to separate fact from law, and legal arguments are tightly entwined with and 
dependent upon characterizations of the facts.30 
The classic example of a factual positional conflict is Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 31 where 
New Hampshire Legal Assistance represented two class clients: mentally retarded 
citizens and women prisoners.  When the state offered to settle the prisoner litigation by 
offering a facility already being used for the mentally retarded, the previously unrelated 
lawsuits became related and the NHLA found itself unable to advocate two different uses 
of the same facility.  Had the lawyers agreed to the settlement offer, the settlement would 
have had a direct and immediate impact on their other class clients.  And, as with any 
factual conflict, there would be the danger of misusing a client’s confidential information, 
another basis for finding a conflict of interest.32 
A positional conflict of interest can arise in a litigation, transactional or lobbying context, 
or some combination thereof. 33 The litigation context is the paradigm example, because 
there the lawyer is asserting two contrary legal arguments as correct. The lobbying 
 
28 Rotunda, supra note 18, at § 8-6.14.5. 
29 SEE MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(b), 3.3, 3.4 (2004).  By a factual conflict I mean a conflict 
about what the facts are (e.g., what happened, who is telling the truth), rather than a conflict about the 
significance or characterization of similar facts (e.g.,  whether a shoe is a deadly weapon). 
30 Louis E. Wolcher, Pavcnik’s Theory of Legal Decisionmaking: An Introduction, 72 WASH. L. REV. 469, 
472-73 (1997). 
31 827 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1987), discussed in Rotunda, supra, note 18, at § 8-6.14.5. 
32 See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(b) (2004); See also Westinghouse, infra note 90, where the 
firm’s conflicting positions on the competitiveness of the uranium industry created a factual positional 
conflict and the danger of misusing confidential information.  
33 Dzienkowski , supra note 13, at 464. Dzienkowski first identified these three categories of conflicts, but 
used the litigation positional conflict as the “model for analyzing all positional conflicts of interest.” Id.
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context presents similar concerns where the lawyer asserts conflicting positions about 
what the law should be.   In a transactional context, the lawyer may be advising clients to 
take a position or course of action as a tactical matter and can explain the risks—thus, 
where both matters are transactional there is little real conflict.34 But where one matter is 
transactional and the other is litigational, a serious positional conflict can develop.  In the 
litigation matter the lawyer may advocate a position that undercuts the position the 
lawyer helped the transactional client to take.35 The present analysis will focus primarily 
on positional conflicts in a litigation context because it is the “paradigm example” and 
brings into focus the debates about lawyer sincerity and loyalty.    
 
The most troublesome aspect of defining positional conflicts is determining when 
arguments conflict.  Not every contrary legal position constitutes a positional conflict: 
some are innocuous. “[L]awyers take contrary legal positions all the time.  They 
sometimes take conflicting legal positions in the same case.”36 For example, a lawyer 
may argue in one case that legislative intent is a proper source of statutory interpretation 
even where the text is clear, but in another case urge the court not to look beyond the 
plain text of the statute despite clear evidence of a different statutory intent. Such a 
“conflict” would not strike most lawyers as noteworthy; in fact a lawyer who stubbornly 
stuck to one view of statutory interpretation in every representation, no matter what the 
result for the client, would be viewed as inept.37 Whether conflicting arguments rise to 
the level of a positional conflict will depend at least in part on how important the issues 
are to each representation.38 Some argue that positional conflicts can only arise with 
substantive, as opposed to procedural, legal arguments;39 although the line between 
substance and procedure is tricky to draw, and some “procedural” issues can be of great 
 
34 Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 467 
35 See discussion of conflict of interest involving the law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom.  
Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 468. 
36 Rotunda, supra note 18, at § 8-6.14.4. 
37 See e.g. NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION chp. 45 (2004).
38 Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 509.  
39 See Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 484, n. 219-220; ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, 
Formal Op. 93-377, n.1 (1993). 
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significance to the clients.40 The difficulty in distinguishing between innocuous and 
significant positional conflicts is one argument against requiring lawyers to avoid them.41 
Most authorities say that a conflict with a position taken on behalf of a former client 
raises no ethical concerns—that a positional conflict can only arise between concurrent 
clients.42 If the former representation has concluded, then, especially in the litigation 
context, the lawyer’s subsequent representation can do no harm to the former client’s 
case. Provided that the former and current representations do not run afoul of other 
ethical prohibitions, a lawyer is free to change positions or clients over time.43 Were this 
not the case, lawyers would have difficulty changing their practice and, for example, 
moving from defense work to plaintiff’s work in a particular area. 
 
The prevalence of positional conflicts is difficult to gauge. Some sources suggest that 
lawyers commonly practice with positional conflicts; that arguing different sides of the 
same legal issue is part of everyday lawyering.  Ethics opinions from California, 
Philadelphia, and New York state that positional conflicts are common.44 One 
commentator seems to accept that “It is the job of the lawyer to argue in one way for 
client A on Monday and in the opposite way for client B on Tuesday.”45 An article in a 
family law journal states that divorce lawyers commonly represent both husbands and 
 
40 See, e.g.,  Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 655 (1941) (whether plaintiff could be found in contempt for 
refusing to submit to a physical examination was a matter of procedure). 
41 See Part III (C), infra.
42 See discussion of ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-377 (1993), infra;
But see Dzienkwoski, supra note 13, at note 44. 
43 Dzienkowski notes that an exception might arise where the former client is a repeat player whom the 
lawyer expects to represent again. Dzienkowksi, supra note 13, at 496. In such a situation, the former client 
might be considered more of a continuing client than a former client. Dzienkowski also notes that a lawyer 
switching sides on an issue might have credibility problems with the court.  Id., at 497., and that 
transactional lawyers who develop contractual provisions for clients should not be able to attack those 
provisions later even in unrelated cases.  Id. at 530-531. But he concludes that limitations on successive 
positional conflicts should be limited: “To give former clients a right to prevent lawyer s from taking 
different positions in the future would give the past too much of a claim on the future.” Id., at 498. 
44 The California committee stated that positional conflicts are “common and prolific in our adversarial 
system of justice.” California Ethics Opinion no. 1989-108 at 3. The Philadelphia opinion states that 
“Practices throughout the country all have lawyers who go into court on one day and argue an interpretation 
of the law for custody for a mother and the next day go into a different court in a different case and argue a 
different interpretation for a father.  This is the essence of what a lawyer does.” Philadelphia Ethics 
Opinion 89-27 at 2. The Maine opinion, on the other hand, says positional conflicts are rare (perhaps 
meaning consequential conflicts). Maine Ethics Opinion. No. 155 (1997) at 4. 
45 J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869, 887 (1993). 
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wives, as well as other family members or interested parties so that “it is common for 
divorce lawyers to represent clients with antagonistic legal, as distinguished from factual, 
positions.”46 Arguments against requiring firms to screen for positional conflicts often 
assume that such conflicts are numerous, if mostly insignificant.  
 
Yet other sources suggest that while lawyers often feel the pressure of potential positional 
conflicts, they frequently resolve the problem by not undertaking the second 
representation—in other words, the positional conflict never materializes.47 In an age of 
increasing competition and specialization, many lawyers have abandoned the cab rank 
view and instead practice on one side of an area, thereby avoiding many significant 
positional conflicts and keeping their clients happy. Certainly there is very little litigation 
over positional conflicts. 
 
It may be that these seemingly contradictory observations about the prevalence of 
positional conflicts can be reconciled by distinguishing between minor positional 
conflicts over less important legal issues (of which there are many) and major positional 
conflicts over issues of great significance to the parties (of which there are few).  It may 
also be that lawyer independence and the prevalence of positional conflicts varies with 
practice types and legal communities.  
 
II. Historical context and the evolution of the ABA position on positional 
conflicts 
 
46 David Walther and Anne Kass, Positional Conflict: Considering a One-Side-Representation Rule, 13 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW 137 (1999). 
47 Spaulding, infra note 159, and Shapiro, supra note 20, at 1166. These sources contain interviews with 
lawyers indicating that fear of alienating important clients causes them to reject cases that would require 
arguing against these clients’ institutional interests.  For example, during one of Shapiro’s interviews, the 
managing partner of a large Philadelphia law firm observed, "My theory is that, of every three phone calls I 
get, I get to take one on as a client. I've always said that somebody could have a law firm about the size of 
[this firm] just taking on our conflicted representations."  Id. at n.16.  See also, Robert R. Kuehn, Shooting 
the Messenger:  The Ethics of Attacks on Environmental Representation, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 417, 
426 n. 44  (2002). 
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Although lawyers’ conflicts of interest have been the subject of regulation since medieval 
times,48 there is little if any discussion of positional conflicts of interest before the 
adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983.  Neither the 1908 
Canons of Professional Ethics nor the 1969 Model Code of Professional Conduct 
mentioned the issue, except arguably in the general prohibitions of conflicts of interest,49 
and in the pro bono context by allowing lawyers to advocate law reform contrary to the 
interest or desires of a client.50 One commentator has suggested that broad language in 
Canon 651 of the 1908 Canons caused positional conflicts to be “given an overly zealous 
application,”52 but there is little evidence of that zeal in the caselaw or other written 
record.53 According to Professor Hazard, “the traditional concept of the advocate’s role 
did not recognize positional conflicts as worthy of serious concern.”54 This traditional 
concept included a “fierce insistance” on a lawyer’s independence and to the “so-called 
cab rank rule.”55 Senator Carpenter’s dual representation in the 1872 Supreme Court 
supports Hazard’s conclusion.56 The English bar, always more committed to the cab rank 
rule than American lawyers, had historical examples of lawyers arguing whatever 
 
48 As early as 1280, a London Ordinance forbade attorneys from representing adverse parties in the same 
action and from dropping one client to represent another in the same case. Jonathan Rose, The 
Ambidextrous Lawyer: Conflict of Interest and the Medieval and Early Modern Legal Profession, 7 U. CHI.
L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 137, 146-147 (2000)).   
49 Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 469.   
50 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-17 (1980); See Rotunda, supra note 19, at § 8-6.14.2. 
The law reform provision addresses positions a lawyer might take not in his capacity as a legal 
representative, and does not focus on situations where the lawyer takes contrary legal positions for different 
clients.  See also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 6.3, 6.4 (2004), allowing lawyers to serve as 
directors, officers or members of law reform organizations without creating a lawyer-client relationship.  
Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 531-536, discusses positional conflicts in the context of a lawyer’s personal 
law reform activities.   
51 Canon 6 defined a conflict to include “when, in behalf of one client, it is [the lawyer’s ]duty to contend 
for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.” CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL 
ETHICS § 7.3 (1986); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 6 (1908). 
52 Wolfram, supra note 51.  Professor Dzienkowski notes that this assertion was not supported by specific 
examples other than the case of Estates Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 345 F.Supp. 93 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). Dzienkowski, supra note 13 at n.47. 
53 Dzienkowski notes a 1981 Legal Ethics Forum in which the participants discussed what appeared to be a 
hypothetical positional conflict (without naming it as such), but notes the participants seemed most 
concerned about the positional conflict developing into a standard conflict of interest if the two clients 
ended up on opposite sides of a lawsuit. Dzienkowski, supra note 13 at n. 49 (discussing Legal Ethics 
Forum, 67 A.B.A.J. 1692 (1981)). 
54 GEOFFERY C. HAZARD, JR., W. WILLIAM HODES, JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, THE LAW OF LAWYERING 
§10.10 (2004 Supp.) 
55 Id.
56 See note 6, supra.
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position was assigned them—including trial lawyers who traveled with judges and took 
sides as needed. 57 
Before the ABA’s first express statement on positional conflicts in 1983, the American 
legal profession underwent significant changes.  The end of the nineteenth century was a 
time of increasing professionalism for lawyers, as legal education evolved under 
Christopher Langdell.58 Bar associations formed and erected barriers to entry through 
educational and bar examination requirements.59 The lawyer to population ratio thus 
remained relatively stable until the 1970’s, when law schools “nearly doubled their 
enrollments.”60 During the first half of the century, the overwhelming majority of lawyers 
were in private practice, and most lawyers practiced solo. 61 
Beginning in the 70’s, the traditional barriers to entry ceased to keep down the number of 
new lawyers. Between 1951 and 1995, the number of lawyers increased more than 
fourfold.62 Between 1960 and 1995, the lawyer to population ration went from 1: 627 to 
1:307.  The number and percentage of lawyers working for the government increased 
significantly, and the percentage of solo practitioners went from 61.2 in 1948 to 33.2 in 
1988.63 More and more lawyers are employees rather than independent professionals.64 
The increase in lawyers has been accompanied by an increase in competition and 
specialization.  At the same time, lawyers are practicing in ever larger groups, as the 
number and size of large private firms has grown.65 Within these large firms, lawyers are 
 
57 See Shaffer, infra note 175 at n.14 (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, A Historical Perspective on the Attorney-
Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1071 (1978)). Shaffer argues that American lawyers were always 
more identified with their clients than English lawyers, who maintained more independence—and that an 
ethic of independence (or separation from client) grew up later. Id.
58 Philip Gaines, The “True Lawyer” in America: Discursive Construction of the Legal Profession in the 
Nineteenth Century, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 132, 133, 152-153 (2001). 
59 Richard L. Abel, The Transformation of the American Legal Profession, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 7, 9 
(1986). 
60 Robert W. Gordon, The Legal Profession, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY 292 (Austin Sarat, 
Bryant Garth, and Robert A. Kagan, eds., 2002); Abel, supra note 59, at 9. 
61 LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 461-62 (Yale University Press, 
2002)  
62 Id. at 457. 
63 Gordon supra note 60, at 293. 
64 Abel supra note 59, at 16. 
65 Friedman, supra note 61, at 462.  In the late 50’s, there were only 38 firms with more than 50 lawyers.  
In 1995 there were 702, and the largest, Baker & McKenzie, had 1,754. Id.
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increasingly segregated by areas of substantive expertise. 66 Thus, the typical lawyer’s 
employment changed from a solo, general practice to employment by a large institution, 
government agency, or firm.  The typical lawyer was no longer a general practitioner, but 
likely to be a specialist on one side of a class of cases.  A rule against positional conflicts 
is consistent with such specialization. 
 
Along with the enormous growth and specialization of the legal profession that occurred 
between Senator Carpenter’s time and the 1983 Model Code, there was a significant shift 
in the profession’s understanding of the law and how it worked.  The predominant view 
of law in the Nineteenth Century was a belief in natural law giving way later to a 
classical view of law as the objective application of known principles.67 Thus judges 
were viewed as constrained by rules, rules that could be determined correctly through 
reason.68 This objective conception of law gave way in the early twentieth century to 
legal realism.  The legal realists, whose influence persists, attacked legal objectivity and 
formalism as a facade.  They argued that “rules are malleable,” that law is never neutral 
but inextricably bound up with politics.69 This realist view gradually gained hold with the 
bar at large and today its central tenets are considered unremarkable.70 The change in the 
predominant view of the working of the law is also consistent with a change in the 
attitude toward positional conflicts.71 
66 John P. Heinz, Edward O. Laumann, Robert L. Nelson, Ethan Michelson, The Changing Character of 
Lawyers’ Work: Chicago in 1975 and 1995, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 751, 759-60 (1998).  This article 
compares characteristics of law practice in Chicago based on surveys in 1975 and 1995.  The 1975 study 
showed a bar divided by prestige between corporate lawyers and those who served individuals.  In 1995 the 
division was more complicated due to increased specialization and competition. 
67 Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE 
CRITIQUE 19-26 (David Kairys, ed.,1982). As Mensch explains, these predominant views were complicated 
and always evolving. 
68 Id. at 24. 
69 See Friedman, supra note 61, at 489-497; Mensch supra note 67, at 26-29. 
70 Friedman, supra note 61, at 493. 
71 Under the earlier view of the law as objective, a lawyer’s role in the creation of law would be considered 
minimal, and a purely legal positional conflict would not be thought likely to affect the outcome of either 
case. After the legal realist view had pervaded the bar, with a sense of the indeterminacy of law and 
outcomes, it makes sense that the lawyer’s role in the creation of law would be seen as greater.  Strategic 
choices about arguments are seen as critical when there is no objectively correct outcome to be found 
through the exercise of judicial reason. Lawyers and judges together create the law.  Under this view, a 
lawyer arguing two sides of a legal question has the potential to do more harm to one of her clients, than 
would a lawyer who, under the earlier view, is simply helping the court uncover the objectively correct 
outcome. See Spaulding, ___, at 1400, citing Geoffrey Hazard, Ethics in the Practice of Law 89 (1978).  
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Against this backdrop of growth, specialization, competition, and philosophical change, 
the ABA promulgated the 1983 Model Rules of Professional Responsibility.  These 
included Model Rule 1.7, which addressed current conflicts of interest.   The rule stated 
that a lawyer shall not represent a client “if the representation of that client will be 
directly adverse to another client” or “if the representation of that client may be 
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or 
by the lawyer’s own interests,” unless the lawyer reasonably believed that the 
representation would not be affected and the client consented after consultation.72 The 
rule itself did not mention positional conflicts, but the comments to Model Rule 1.7 
included a short discussion that seemed to allow positional conflicts except under certain 
circumstances: 
 
A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal 
question that has arisen in different cases, unless representation of either 
client would be adversely affected.  Thus, it is ordinarily not improper to 
assert such positions in cases pending in different trial courts, but it may 
be improper to do so in cases pending at the same time in an appellate 
court.73 
Comment 9 did not set down a rigid rule, but introduced the idea of positional conflict as 
an ethical issue.  The comment was criticized for recognizing a positional conflict only 
before an appellate court when trial court decisions could also be influential with other 
judges.74 The comment was criticized for using the term “adversely affected” rather than 
the “directly adverse” or “materially limited” language of the rule: “This ambiguity 
essentially allows lawyers to decide for themselves when a litigational positional conflict 
requires the independent determination of the effect on the client and the clients’ consent 
 
72 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (1983).  The rule was rewritten in 2002, but the “directly 
adverse” and “materially limited” language remains, as do the concepts of informed but objectively 
reasonable consent.   
73 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.1.7, cmt. para. 9 (1983). 
74 Wolfram, supra note 51, at 355, n. 41; Douglas R. Richmond, Choosing Sides: Issue or Positional 
Conflicts of Interest, 51 FLA. L. REV. 383, 390 (1999) 
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after disclosure.”75 Another criticism was that the comment said nothing about notice and 
disclosure of positional conflicts to clients.76 Thus, the criticisms urged a stronger rule 
against positional conflicts. 
 
A 1993 ABA Ethics opinion departed from the Model Rule comment in analyzing 
positional conflicts of interest. The authors of the opinion rejected the comment’s 
distinction between appellate and trial courts, noting: 
 
[E]ven if both cases were in the trial court, but assigned to different 
judges, the decision in the first-decided case would, in all likelihood, 
carry at least some precedential or persuasive weight in the second 
case.  And if both cases should happen to end up before the same 
judge, the situation would be even worse.  For although judges well 
understand that lawyers, at various stages of their careers, can find 
themselves arguing different sides of the same issue, the 
persuasiveness and credibility of the lawyer’s arguments in at least one 
of the two pending matters would quite possibly be lessened, 
consciously or subconsciously, in the mind of the judge.77 
The opinion thus advised that if there were a “substantial risk” that one representation 
would create a legal precedent, “even if not binding,” which is “likely materially to 
undercut the legal position urged on behalf of the other client,” the lawyer should not 
represent both clients without their consent after full disclosure. 
 
Where the two matters would not be litigated in the same jurisdiction, the opinion 
suggested the following considerations in deciding whether representation of either client 
would be materially limited:78 
75 Dzienkowski supra note 13, at 473.   
76 Id. at 473-4. 
77 ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-377, p.2 (1993). 
78 The Committee concluded that the “materially limited” language of then Model Rule 1.7 (b), rather than 
the “directly adverse” language of then Model Rule 1.7(a) applied, since in a positional conflict the 
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(a) Is the issue one of such importance that its determination is likely 
to affect the ultimate outcome of at least one of the cases?  
(b) Is the determination of the issue in one case likely to have a 
significant impact on the determination of that issue in the other case? 
(For example, does the issue involve a new or evolving area of the 
law, where the first case decided may be regarded as persuasive 
authority by other courts, regardless of their geographical location? 
Or: is the issue one of federal law, where the decision by one federal 
judge will be given respectful consideration by another federal judge, 
even though they are not in the same district or state?)  
(c) Will there be any inclination by the lawyer, or her firm, to "soft-
pedal" or de-emphasize certain arguments or issues--which otherwise 
would be vigorously pursued--so as to avoid impacting the other case?  
(d) Will there be any inclination within the firm to alter any arguments 
for one, or both clients, so that the firm's position in the two cases can 
be reconciled--and, if so, could that redound to the detriment of one of 
the clients?79 
The Committee’s analysis was limited to positional conflicts between current clients.  
The Committee noted that lawyers were free to change positions from those advanced for 
former clients and that such changes raised no ethical issues.80 
In response to criticism, and in light of the 1993 Opinion, the comment to 1.7 was 
amended in 2002 as part of the large-scale amendments to the model rules.  (The text of 
the rule was also amended).81 The new comment 24 on positional conflicts states: 
 
attorney’s clients are not involved in the same litigation and are not therefore ever directly adverse to on 
another.  Id., n. 4. 
79 The pressure to reconcile arguments so that the positional conflict never materializes is an important 
concern.  But including this factor in the analysis of a positional conflict does not seem all that helpful if 
the real problem is that this pressure results in the suppression of a positional conflict.  If there is no 
positional conflict, there will be no need to look at the factors.  Instead, lawyers should think about this 
factor whenever they consider related issues in otherwise unrelated cases. See section IV (A), infra.
80 Id, at 1.  Richmond, supra note 74, reached a similar conclusion, as does Dzienkowski (with 
reservations), supra note 13, at 480 and Hazard, supra note 54; See Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at n. 111. 
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Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in different 
tribunals at different times on behalf of different clients. The mere fact 
that advocating a legal position on behalf of one client might create 
precedent adverse to the interests of a client represented by the lawyer in 
an unrelated matter does not create a conflict of interest. A conflict of 
interest exists, however, if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's action 
on behalf of one client will materially limit the lawyer's effectiveness in 
representing another client in a different case; for example, when a 
decision favoring one client will create a precedent likely to seriously 
weaken the position taken on behalf of the other client. Factors relevant in 
determining whether the clients need to be advised of the risk include: 
where the cases are pending, whether the issue is substantive or 
procedural, the temporal relationship between the matters, the significance 
of the issue to the immediate and long-term interests of the clients 
involved and the clients' reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer. If 
there is significant risk of material limitation, then absent informed 
consent of the affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one of the 
representations or withdraw from one or both matters. 
 
Thus, the official statements of the ABA, in the form of its 1993 opinion and the 
comments to the Model Rules, are that a positional conflict is not per se an ethical 
violation, but that an attorney should look carefully at the attendant circumstances 
to determine whether a significant risk of material limitation of either 
representation exists.  According to the ABA, a material limitation may result 
where the issue is sufficiently important to the clients and victory in one case will 
create adverse precedent for the other.  While the 1993 opinion mentions 
credibility concerns, these are not the focus of the suggested analytical framework 
either in the opinion or the rule comments. 
 
81 See note 72, supra.
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III. Other Legal Authorities on Positional Conflicts 
 A. The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers 
 
The approach of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers to 
positional conflicts is very similar to the new comment 24 to Model Rule 1.7.  It 
suggests the same factors for determining whether a positional conflict creates a 
conflict of interest and begins with the presumption that taking inconsistent 
positions in different courts is acceptable. 82 The Restatement factors for 
evaluating a positional conflict seem to focus on the significance of the legal issue 
and the risk of creating adverse precedent for one of the clients. The illustrations 
provided emphasize the distinction between appellate and trial courts, as well as 
substance and procedure.83 
B. Caselaw addressing positional conflicts 
 
82 The official comment to section 128 provides: 
A lawyer ordinarily may take inconsistent legal positions in different courts at 
different times. While each client is entitled to the lawyer's effective advocacy of that 
client's position, if the rule were otherwise law firms would have to specialize in a single 
side of legal issues. 
However, a conflict is presented when there is a substantial risk that a lawyer's action 
in Case A will materially and adversely affect another of the lawyer's clients in Case B. 
Factors relevant in determining the risk of such an effect include whether the issue is 
before a trial court or an appellate court; whether the issue is substantive or procedural; 
the temporal relationship between the matters; the practical significance of the issue to 
the immediate and long-run interests of the clients involved; and the clients' reasonable 
expectations in retaining the lawyer. If a conflict of interest exists, absent informed 
consent of the affected clients under § 122, the lawyer must withdraw from one or both of 
the matters. 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, § 128, cmt. f. 
83 Id., illustrations 5,6: 
5. Lawyer represents two clients in damage actions pending in different United States District 
Courts. In one case, representing the plaintiff, Lawyer will attempt to introduce certain evidence at 
trial and argue there for its admissibility. In the other case, representing a defendant, Lawyer will 
object to an anticipated attempt by the plaintiff to introduce similar evidence. Even if there is some 
possibility that one court's ruling might be published and cited as authority in the other proceeding, 
Lawyer may proceed with both representations without obtaining the consent of the clients involved.  
6. The same facts as in Illustration 5, except that the cases have proceeded to the point where 
certiorari has been granted in each by the United States Supreme Court to consider the common 
evidentiary question. Any position that Lawyer would assert on behalf of either client on the legal 
issue common to each case would have a material and adverse impact on the interests of the other 
client. Thus, a conflict of interest is presented. Even the informed consent of both Client A and Client 
B would be insufficient to permit Lawyer to represent each before the Supreme Court. 
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There is next to no caselaw on purely legal positional conflicts, in striking 
contrast to the enormous number of decisions on conflicts of interest in general,84 
and what exists provides little guidance. The two cases that discuss purely legal 
positional conflicts are criminal cases involving public defenders; they reach very 
different conclusions.  The cases usually cited by commentators on positional 
conflicts actually present factual positional conflicts—the attorneys are at cross 
purposes with the same set of facts, even if not in the same case.   
 
One case frequently cited in writings on positional conflicts is the 1972 Estates 
Theatres, Inc., v Columbia Pictures Indus.85 In this antitrust action, the lawyer for 
plaintiff Estates Theatres also represented United Artists Theatre Circuit as a 
plaintiff in another antitrust action.  Although not a defendant in the first action, 
UATC had been named as a co-conspirator in a letter by the plaintiff, and plaintiff 
had alleged that a theater owned by UATC was receiving more favorable 
treatment than plaintiff’s theatre.  The defendants moved to disqualify plaintiff’s 
counsel, arguing that “to support its claim he would necessarily be required to 
offer evidence that . . .  one of the theatres owned by UATC, was the beneficiary 
of unlawful conduct at the expense of plaintiff, his other client.” The defense also 
argued that plaintiff’s efforts to unearth evidence of UATC’s unlawful conduct 
would help the government in its own separate antitrust action against UATC.  
Thus the case seems to present a factual positional conflict because the plaintiff’s 
attorney would be forced to develop and argue facts that would damage his other 
client.   
 
But it is perhaps the court’s “sweeping language”86 that has lead to its frequent 
citation: 
 
84 Rotunda, supra note 18 at § 6.2-2. 
85 345 F.Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Cited in Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 470; Wolfram, supra note 51; 
Richmond, supra note 74 at 398. 
86 Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 471. 
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A lawyer should not be permitted to put himself in a position 
where, even unconsciously he will be tempted to ‘soft pedal’ his 
zeal in furthering the interests of one client in order to avoid an 
obvious clash with those of another, at least in the absence of the 
express consent of both clients. . . .The attorney cannot at one 
and the same time be the prosecutor of the plaintiff’s claim . . . 
and the defender of the target, UATC . . . .  To allow such 
conflicting positions under the facts here presented would impair 
the confidence and respect of the community towards its bench 
and bar.87 
Arguably such language could be applied to legal positional conflicts as well as factual 
conflicts. The danger that a lawyer may modify arguments to accommodate both 
representations exists in both a factual and legal positional conflict.88 
Two other factual positional conflict cases, Fiandaca v. Cunningham89 and Westinghouse 
Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,90 are also sometimes cited as examples of positional 
conflicts.91 In Fiandaca, as discussed earlier, the New Hampshire Legal Assistance 
represented two class action clients and was faced with a conflict when the state offered 
to settle one class action by offering a facility then used by the other class.  NHLA 
responded to the settlement offer by stating it was unwilling to agree to an offer that was 
“against the stated interests” of its other clients,92 clearly flagging its conflict of interest. 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the NHLA should have been disqualified 
because its representation of one class was materially limited by its responsibilities to 
another, at least with respect to the settlement offer.93 “In short, the combination of 
 
87 345 F. Supp. at 99. 
88 This is the lesson that Professor Rotunda suggests taking from the factual positional conflict in Fiandaca.
Rotunda, supra note 18, at § 8-6.14.5. 
89 827 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1987). 
90 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978) 
91 Rotunda, supra note 18, at § 8-6.14.5; Richmond, supra note 74, at 400-403. 
92 827 F.2d at 827. 
93 The Fiandaca case has generated considerable discussion about scarcity of legal services and 
disqualification motions.  See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, More About Us:  Another Take on the Abusive Use of 
Legal Ethics Rules, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 843, 845 (1998); Kathy E. Hinck, Second Class Prisoners:  
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clients and circumstances placed NHLA in the untenable position of being 
simultaneously obligated to represent vigorously the interests of two conflicting 
clients.”94 The factual conflict in Fiandaca seems quite clear.  While there may be policy 
reasons to argue against disqualification—most notably the lack of alternative counsel for 
an indigent class—it is difficult to argue that NHLA’s representation was not 
compromised by its conflicting loyalties with respect to the facility that was the subject of 
the settlement offer.  In addition, as with any factual conflict, there was probably a risk 
that confidential information from one client would be used against another client.   
 
The possible misuse of confidential information was a large part of the court’s rationale 
in disqualifying counsel in the Westinghouse case.  The law firm of Kirkland and Ellis 
represented plaintiff Westinghouse in an antitrust case alleging an illegal conspiracy in 
restraint of trade in the uranium industry.  At the same time, Kirkland and Ellis 
represented the American Petroleum Institute, of which three defendants in the 
Westinghouse suit were members, and lobbied Congress on API’s behalf.  As part of that 
lobbying effort, Kirkland and Ellis took the position that the uranium industry was 
competitive and not in need of regulation. Thus its positions on the competitiveness of 
the uranium industry conflicted.  However, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ordered 
disqualification not so much because of these conflicting positions, but because Kirkland 
and Ellis had entered into a fiduciary relationship—if not a full-fledged attorney-client 
relationship—with the individual members of API (including those who were defendants 
in the Westinghouse litigation). The law firm had solicited confidential business 
information from those members and lead them to believe it would remain protected.95 
The Westinghouse case is thus more about a lawyer’s fiduciary duty than positional 
conflicts. 
 
New Hampshire’s Placement Policy for Female Offenders, 15 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 225 (1989). 
94 827 F.2d at 829. 
95 580 F.2d at 1321. 
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The first case to address a straightforward purely legal positional conflict is Williams v. 
State.96 In that case, the attorney appointed to represent a client on his appeal from 
conviction and death sentence for murder moved to withdraw.  The attorney asserted that 
his client had an arguable appeal issue that the trial court erred when it gave “great 
weight” to the jury’s non-unanimous recommendation of the death penalty.  However, the 
attorney had already filed a brief in the same court (the highest court of Delaware) 
arguing in another case that the trial court erred when it failed to give great weight to the 
jury’s non-unanimous recommendation against the death penalty.  The attorney argued 
that he had a conflict of interest because of the risk that he would create unfavorable 
precedent for one client, his credibility with the court would be undermined, and his 
clients would reasonably question his loyalty to them.97 The State agreed that the 
attorney had a conflict of interest.   
 
The court allowed the withdrawal, holding that “It would be a violation of the Delaware 
Rules of Professional Conduct for [the attorney] to advocate conflicting legal positions in 
two capital murder appeals that are pending simultaneously in this Court.”98 Delaware 
had adopted the Model Rules, including Rule 1.7 and the earlier comment that 
emphasized the inappropriateness of a positional conflict in an appellate court.99 The 
court also alluded to the criminal clients’ constitutional rights to effective assistance of 
counsel on appeal.100 Because there was no opposition to the motion to withdraw, either 
from the state or the client, the decision does not really test the arguments for or against  
a positional conflict under these circumstances.  
 
96 805 A.2d 880 (Del. 2002). 
97 The arguments in the two cases could be reconciled, of course, by arguing in both cases that only a jury 
recommendation of leniency should be given great weight.  By the time the attorney received the second 
case, it may have been too late to tailor the arguments in the first case.  Moreover, to change the arguments 
in this way would have been to allow one representation to limit the other.  See section IV, infra.
98 805 A.2d at 882. 
99 805 A.2d at 881. 
100 “Given his clients’ disparate legal arguments, [the attorney’s] independent obligations to his clients may 
compromise the effectiveness of his assistance as appellate counsel for one or both clients unless his 
motion to withdraw is granted.” 805 A.2d at 882. Interestingly, the attorney who was later appointed to 
represent Williams did not even raise the jury recommendation issue, but obtained a reversal of the death 
penalty on another ground. See Williams v. State, 818 A.2d 906 (Del. 2002) (reversing death sentence). 
Telephone interview with Bernard J. O’Donnell, attorney for appellant in State v. Williams, 805 A.2d 880 
(Del. 2002). 
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Another criminal case discussed positional conflicts in an adversarial setting, and with 
different results.  In Federal Defenders of San Diego Inc., v. United States Sentencing 
Commission,101 organizations of federal public defenders brought suit challenging the 
constitutionality of sentencing guidelines issued by the United States Sentencing 
Commission.  The case was dismissed for lack of standing.  As part of their argument for 
standing, the plaintiffs had claimed injury in fact based on positional conflicts that would 
be created by the sentencing guidelines.  The lawyers argued that because some of their 
clients would be better off under the guidelines while the majority would be worse off, if 
they successfully challenged the guidelines on behalf of the majority they would actually 
injure some of their clients.  They noted that the ethical dilemma is “exacerbated” 
because they would rarely know until well into a case whether a particular client fell into 
the disadvantaged group.  The court rejected the argument, doubting the significance of 
the number of conflicting cases.  
 
The court also expressed doubt about whether a positional conflict was an ethical 
problem.  “In addition, with all due respect to [plaintiff’s expert], I am not at all 
convinced that the taking of inconsistent positions in separate cases raises the sort of 
ethical dilemma that [the expert] suggests.” But the court recognized the discomfort 
individual attorneys may feel and recommended that they be allowed to recuse 
themselves “when they consider it appropriate.” 102 
The paucity of caselaw discussing legal positional conflicts does not mean such 
positional conflicts do not arise.  There is evidence both for and against the 
prevalence of positional conflicts in practice.103 The lack of caselaw may be 
explained by, among other reasons,  (1) scarcity of positional conflicts, (2) the 
ability of lawyers to make conflicts go away through careful tailoring or 
distinguishing of arguments, (3) such conflicts are suppressed when an attorney 
bows to pressure from a powerful client, (4) such conflicts go undetected because 
 
101 680 F.Supp. 26 (D.C.D.C. 1988). Seventeen years later, the guidelines were ruled unconstitutional. 
United States v. Booker, 2005 WL 50108 (Jan 12, 2005).                            
102 680 F.Supp. at 30. 
103 See supra. 
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they are in different courts or jurisdictions, or (5) an opponent detecting such a 
conflict would rather impeach the lawyer with the conflict than move to 
disqualify.  For whatever reason, positional conflicts do not seem to be giving rise 
to significant litigation, and therefore cases do not provide significant guidance in 
this area. The most recent cases involve public defenders, who cannot be fired, 
who cannot quietly drop one client to eliminate a problem, and who have no 
financial conflict between clients that might cause them to suppress a positional 
conflict.  
 
C. State ethics opinions 
 
State and local bar opinions that have addressed positional conflicts have drawn 
heavily from the ABA ethics opinion, the Model Rules and the Restatement. Like 
these authorities, most bar associations have concluded that a positional conflict 
before the same judge may create a conflict under Rule 1.7, but one to which 
clients may usually consent after full disclosure.   On the other hand, wary of the 
practical implications of an ethical prohibition on positional conflicts, and aware 
of the difficulty of separating innocuous conflicts from the more serious, two 
states have concluded that a legal positional conflict is not a conflict of interest.  
Even those states that do not find a positional conflict to be a conflict of interest 
recommend that attorneys disclose the problem to their clients.   
 
No conflict. The Bars of California and Maine have determined that a legal 
positional conflict is not a conflict of interest, even when the attorney argues 
opposite sides of an issue before the same court.  The 1989 opinion of the 
California State Bar Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and 
Conduct was based on a scenario in which the attorney had to argue contrary legal 
positions in two cases pending in federal court, assigned to the same judge. The 
committee characterized these facts as the “ ‘worst case’ scenario presented by the 
so-called ‘issues conflict’ conundrum.”104 The committee noted the possibility of 
 
104 California Ethics Opinion No. 1989-208 at 2. 
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creating adverse precedent for a client, and the damage to the attorney’s 
credibility before the court, but nevertheless refused to find an ethical violation. 
 
The committee noted that positional conflicts are “common and prolific in our 
adversarial system of justice. Almost daily the litigator or transactional attorney 
finds himself or herself taking positions on behalf of clients which are antithetical 
to another client.” 105 The committee concluded that to impose a burden of 
disclosure and consent on all positional conflicts would be extreme and diminish 
the availability of attorneys. And it determined that it would be impossible to craft 
a rule that could distinguish between serious and trivial positional conflicts: “If it 
were possible to proscribe the nondisclosure and non-consensual representation 
defined by our hypothetical without improperly infringing on the types of inherent 
‘issues conflicts’ which occur commonly and which cannot even be fairly 
detected by even the most dedicated practitioner, we would not hesitate to do so. 
We must conclude that these most rare and extreme scenarios where potential 
harm is high nevertheless must yield, as they have in other instances, to higher 
priorities.”106 
The committee did recommend, however, that the prudent attorney disclose a 
positional conflict where there was reason to believe clients might otherwise be 
harmed, and noted that there might be civil liability for such harm in certain 
circumstances.107 (The committee did not explain what that harm might be, and it 
is difficult to imagine, absent some additional act or omission by the attorney). 
Thus the committee seemed to recognize a potential for harm, but deemed a rule 
against positional conflicts unworkable. 
 
105 Id. at 3. 
106 Id. at 3. The committee also rejected arguments that the positional conflict violated the ethical 
requirements of competence and loyalty. Id. at 4-5. 
107 The committee did not elaborate on the potential for civil liability, but merely stated, “Beyond client 
considerations, the attorney must keep in mind the potential for civil liability if harm to the clients does 
occur which might have been avoided by timely disclosure.” Id. at 4. 
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Similarly the Maine Professional Ethics Commission rejected the approach of the 
ABA 1993 ethics opinion and concluded that “an ‘issue conflict,’ without more, is 
not a conflict of interest.” The commission was in part influenced by its view that 
screening for positional conflicts would be extremely burdensome, and that there 
was little real need: “We decline to interpret [the conflict rules] to require the bar 
to adopt screening procedures for issue conflicts which experience tells us are, in 
any event, extremely rare.”108 But while the commission did not find a conflict of 
interest, it noted that arguing opposite sides of the same issue before the same 
judge or judges could violate other rules requiring the lawyer to employ 
“reasonable care and skill” and to “employ the lawyer’s best judgment.”109 The 
Maine Commission found that it would not be possible to state a rule for when the 
rule would be implicated, but that it would depend on the particular facts.110 
May be Conflict of Interest.  A number of state ethics opinions find that while not 
all positional conflicts present an ethical problem, arguing opposite sides of the 
same legal issue before the same appellate court is a conflict of interest.  Most, 
but not all, find that it may be cured by client consent. 
 
Arizona and Philadelphia bar opinions find that arguing contrary legal positions 
before the same appellate court creates a conflict of interest that must be disclosed 
and consented to by both clients. Like the California Committee, the Philadelphia 
committee assumed that positional conflicts were common: 
 
Practices throughout the country all have lawyers who go into court on 
one day and argue an interpretation of the law for custody for a mother 
and the next day go into a different court in a different case and argue a 
different interpretation for a father.  This is the essence of what a lawyer 
does.111 
108 Maine Ethics Opinion. No. 155 (1997) at 4. 
109 Id. at 4, citing Maine Bar Rule 3.6. 
110 Id.
111 Philadelphia Ethics Opinion No. 89-27 at 2. 
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Unlike the California committee, the Philadelphia committee saw no difficulty in 
recognizing a conflict of interest, but limited the ethical problem to contrary legal 
arguments in the same appellate court. The Philadelphia opinion finds that the 
conflict is imputed to all of the lawyer’s partners and suggests that there may be 
instances when even consent would be inadequate to cure the conflict, but does 
not elaborate on what those circumstances might be.112 The Arizona opinion, on 
the other hand, states that a legal positional conflict can always be cured by 
consent: 
 
We do not believe that the presentation of purely legal arguments before 
an appellate court is the sort of situation that automatically vitiates the 
informed consent of the clients involved to Law Firm A’s continued 
involvement.  Appellate judges are presumably trained to recognize that 
advocates are often required to take positions contrary to those previously 
taken by their partners, when the interests of a client so require.  We 
cannot conclude that the judges of the Ninth Circuit will be prejudiced 
against one side or the other in either of the two cases at issue simply 
because of Law Firm A’s involvement.  The questioning at oral argument 
may be somewhat uncomfortable for the lawyers involved, but we cannot 
conclude that the situation will necessarily prejudice either of the 
clients.113 
A District of Columbia Bar opinion illustrates some of the problems with the prevailing 
approach to positional conflicts.  The opinion responded to an inquiry by a private 
attorney  who regularly represented children and foster parents involved in the child 
welfare system and had been asked to serve as outside general counsel to an association 
of foster parents.  The bar opinion began with the assumption that same day contrary 
legal arguments in the same appellate court would be a conflict of interest. For less stark 
 
112 Id.
113 Arizona Ethics Opinion No. 87-15 (1987). 
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situations, the court referred to the factors set forth in the ABA ethics opinion, and 
suggested that with far-flung offices in large firms, the conflict might not always be 
imputed.114 The opinion implied that client consent could cure any positional conflict. 
The opinion did address what would seem to be the greater danger: that a positional 
conflict would not materialize because the attorney’s greater allegiance would be to the 
larger, repeat client.  
 
The D.C. opinion concluded that because most of the attorney’s work was in one or two 
city courts, “It would be ethically impermissible for her to take simultaneously 
inconsistent positions on issues of law on behalf of different clients in those two courts 
without the informed consent of all of her affected clients where the representation of one 
client creates a substantial likelihood that her success on behalf of one client might 
substantially impact another client adversely.” The opinion thus seems to strengthen 
incentives not to raise conflicting arguments.    
 
The opinion recommended that the attorney alert her individual clients that she 
represented the foster parent organization, inasmuch as she may become identified in the 
eyes of the court as the representative of that organization’s interests. It also discussed the 
possibility of a prospective waiver by the organization, although it did not advise such 
advance waivers by individual clients, who were “unsophisticated consumer[s] of legal 
services.”115 
Faced with a similar power imbalance between clients, the New York City Bar 
Association addressed pro bono representation of complainants before the City Human 
Rights Commission by attorneys who also represented respondents before the 
Commission on unrelated cases.  116 The opinion advised the attorneys to make an 
 
114 D.C. Ethics Opinion No. 265 (1996). 
115 Id.
116 Association of the Bar of the City of New York formal Ethics Opinion No. 1990-4 (1990) The 
Association adopted an earlier draft of the Restatement comment on positional conflicts, which 
distinguished between “representation with ‘indirect precedential effect on another client’s legal 
position’(which presents no conflict) and ‘arguing both sides of an unsettled point of law before the same 
tribunal on behalf of different clients’(which presents a conflict because ‘the argument in each case would 
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independent determination of any perceived conflict but otherwise approved of such pro 
bono representation.  As in the District of Columbia situation, the greater danger here 
seems to be not positional conflicts but that the pro bono attorneys would not raise issues 
likely to annoy paying clients. Like the District of Columbia opinion, the New York 
opinion does not address this danger. 
 
A Michigan ethics opinion takes the most rigid stance against positional conflicts, finding 
that arguing opposite sides of the same issue before the state supreme court would create 
an unconsentable conflict requiring the lawyer to withdraw from both cases.117 That rigid 
stance is no doubt explained by the attorney’s extreme situation. In the facts before the 
Committee the lawyer found himself arguing conflicting legal positions not only before 
the same court, but also where his two conflicting cases had been consolidated.  
Similarly, a New Mexico ethics opinion seems to take the position that a positional 
conflict in the same trial or appellate court would violate the rule against conflicts of 
interest, regardless of consent.118 Attorney credibility seems to be the implicit concern 
with these “same court” positional conflicts. 
 
D. State Professional Conduct rules 
 
The majority of states that have adopted the Model Rules have also adopted the original 
1983 comments that maintained the distinction between positional conflicts in trial and 
appellate courts.  A number have amended their rules to adopt the 2002 ABA 
comments.119 
inevitably affect the other.’)” (quoting ALI Proposed Restatement, THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 209, 
cmt. (f ) (tent. Draft No. 3, April 10, 1990)). 
117 Michigan Ethics Opinion No. RI-108 at 2 (1991). “Under these circumstances a disinterested lawyer 
could not reasonably conclude that the representation of the client would not be adversely affected.”  Id.
118 The New Mexico decision states that the lawyer “should not attempt the dual representation.” New 
Mexico Advisory Opinion No. 1990-3.  Where the positional conflict is in some other context, the lawyer 
should seek the consent of the clients to proceed. Id.
119 As of 2005, nine states have adopted the 2002 ABA comments:  Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, 
Minnesota, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah.   
Massachusetts has provided its own comment, stressing that occasionally a positional conflict may be non-
consentable: 
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One state has addressed positional conflicts in the text of the rule itself.  Oregon’s Code 
of Professional Responsibility states that a positional conflict constitutes a conflict of 
interest only if a lawyer knows his or her firm represents conflicting positions and knows 
that one representation will adversely affect the other: 
 
A conflict of interest is not present solely because one or more lawyers in a firm 
assert conflicting legal positions on behalf of different clients whom the lawyers 
represent in factually unrelated cases. If, however, a lawyer actually knows of the 
assertion of the conflicting positions and also actually knows that an outcome 
favorable to one client in one case will adversely affect the client in the other 
case, the lawyer may not continue with both representations or permit other 
lawyers at the same firm to do so unless all clients consent after full disclosure.120 
Under the Oregon rule, the certainty of adverse precedential effect—the rule does 
not limit such effect to appellate courts—makes a positional conflict a conflict of 
interest, but only where the lawyers knows of the certainty. It is easy to see why 
the Oregon Bar wanted to limit positional conflicts to situations where there 
would be an adverse effect and to those that lawyers actually knew of, so that 
firms are not responsible for unwitting positional conflicts.  But might such a rule 
encourage lawyers to avert their eyes and try not to learn of the positions taken by 
their partners?  The rule requires “actual” knowledge; constructive knowledge is 
not enough.121 
“A lawyer may ordinarily represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal question 
that has arisen in different matters.  However, the antagonism may relate to an issue that is so 
crucial to the resolution of a matter as to require that the clients be advised of the conflict and 
their consent obtained.  On rare occasions , such as the argument of both sides of a legal 
question before the same court at the same time, the conflict may be so severe that a lawyer 
could not continue the representation even with client consent.”  
 
MASS. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 9. 
120 OR. CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(A)(3).   
121 Another approach  might be to require actual knowledge, but also consider the reasonableness of the 
lawyer’s knowledge in light of whether the lawyer maintained an effective system for checking conflicts.  
See DC CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.7, cmt. 
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The District of Columbia rejected a much broader rule on positional conflicts in 
1986.  “Proposed Rule 1.7(b)(5) would have required a lawyer to make full 
disclosure and to seek client consent where other interests of a client will be or are 
likely to be adversely affected by the lawyer’s assumption of such representation, 
and the proposed commentary said that the protected client interests would be as 
broad as business rivalry or personal differences between two potential clients.”122 
The proposed rule met with strong opposition on the grounds that it threatened 
lawyer independence as well as lawyers’ willingness and ability to represent 
unpopular and pro bono clients.  The rule ultimately adopted went in the opposite 
direction of the proposed rule, and affirmed lawyer independence.123 
Neither the proposed nor adopted rule expressly mentioned positional conflicts, 
although both could be read to cover them.  The real target of the final rule is 
business conflicts and preserving lawyers’ independence from powerful clients.  
The D.C. Bar was correct to give prominence to this concern; the ethics rules 
cannot force lawyers to act independently of their powerful clients, but they 
should not forbid them from doing so. 
 
122 D.C. Ethics Opinion No. 265 (1996) 
123 Id. The current DC rule instead contains language limiting client control over the positions attorneys 
take in unrelated matters: “A client may, on occasion, adopt unreasonable positions with respect to having 
the lawyer who is representing that client also represent other parties. Such an unreasonable position may 
be based on an aversion to the other parties being represented by a lawyer, or on some philosophical or 
ideological ground having no foundation in the rules regarding representation of conflicting interests. 
Whatever difficulties may be presented for the lawyer in such circumstances as a matter of client relations, 
the unreasonable positions taken by a client do not fall within the circumstances requiring notification and 
consent. Clients have broad discretion to terminate their representation by a lawyer and that discretion may 
generally be exercised on unreasonable as well as reasonable grounds. 
…
A lawyer retained for a limited purpose may not be aware of the full range of a client's other interests or 
positions on issues. Except in matters involving a specific party or parties, a lawyer is not required to 
inquire of a client concerning the full range of that client's interests in issues, unless it is clear to the lawyer 
that there is a potential for adversity between the interests of clients of the lawyer. Where lawyers are 
associated in a firm within the meaning of Rule 1.10(a), the rule stated in the preceding sentence must be 
applied to all lawyers and all clients in the firm. Unless a lawyer is aware that representing one client 
involves seeking a result to which another client is opposed, Rule 1.7 is not violated by a representation 
that eventuates in the lawyer's unwittingly taking a position for one client adverse to the interests of another 
client. The test to be applied here is one of reasonableness and may turn on whether the lawyer has an 
effective conflict checking system in place.” 
 
DC CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, R. 1.7, cmt. 
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IV. The Real Dangers: Business Conflicts and Credibility Concerns 
 
The preceding review of authorities on positional conflicts shows that a positional 
conflict is not presently seen as a per se conflict of interest and therefore not a per se 
ethical violation.  These authorities cite several key factors in analyzing whether a 
positional conflict rises to the level of an ethical violation: (1) the issue’s importance to 
the cases and clients, (2) the potential that one representation will lead to adverse 
precedent for the other; and, (to a lesser extent), (3) incentives to favor one client over the 
other, and (4) credibility problems.   
 
This prevailing approach to positional conflicts is wrong because it diverts attention away 
from the real ethical dangers.  In fact, business pressures are the more prevalent force in 
practice, and even a soft rule against positional conflicts serves to aggravate these 
economic conflicts.  The focus on positional conflicts as potential conflicts of interest 
only reinforces the power of wealthy clients and restricts client access to counsel of 
choice, especially for poor or low income clients.  The concern with creating adverse 
precedent  has more to do with strategic credibility than with true conflict of interest.  
Thus, a rule against positional conflicts is ill-advised. 
 
At the same time, positional conflicts raise credibility problems that cannot be ignored by 
the prudent lawyer.  There is a tension between the conclusion that there should be no 
rule against positional conflicts, and the acknowledgment of these credibility problems. 
This tension cannot be entirely eliminated, but is best resolved by allowing positional 
conflicts, but also allowing lawyers to withdraw from positional conflicts, as will be 
shown by the example of the public defender.   
 
A. Business Conflicts—not Positional Conflicts—are the Problem 
 
Since the ABA first addressed positional conflicts in the 1983 comments to Model Rule 
1.7, positional conflicts have been analyzed primarily as a particular kind of conflict of 
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interest. This focus has lead to some confusion about the nature of the problem, however, 
as a legal positional conflict by itself is a faulty indicator of a conflict of interest.  In fact, 
when a lawyer actually takes conflicting positions on behalf of separate clients, it shows 
that any conflict may have been overcome. Absent any significant self-interested reason 
for a lawyer to favor one client over the other, a positional conflict does not present a true 
conflict of interest.124 
The more serious problem occurs when a lawyer has a business reason to favor one client 
over the other and therefore is motivated to suppress a positional conflict by either not 
raising the argument for the less favored client or tailoring it so that it does not conflict 
with the argument for the more favored client.125 There are many ways in which this may 
happen.  The lawyer may leave out a meritorious argument, make a much narrower 
argument than he otherwise would, or argue for a much broader interpretation of a rule 
than would an attorney who did not have the business conflict.  A lawyer who argues for 
a broad interpretation of a rule so that it will include both clients may be foregoing a 
narrow argument for one client, a narrow argument that a court would be more likely to 
accept.  On the other hand, a lawyer who makes only a narrow argument may be forgoing 
a broad policy argument that might appeal to some decision-makers.126 And of course, 
lawyers may also avoid a positional conflict by simply dropping or refusing the 
representation of the less favored client.   
 
A clever lawyer can often figure out how to avoid a positional conflict by narrowing the 
arguments in each representation or by distinguishing the cases factually.  Such strategies 
may be in the best interests of the clients—in many cases it may be strategically wise to 
ask for the narrowest ruling.  A lawyer may sincerely believe the distinctions are sound 
and that there is no conflict between the positions.  But where the strategy is influenced 
by the lawyer’s duties to another client a conflict may be present.  Such a conflict will be 
 
124 The lawyer may be faced with competing objectives by clients and other conflicts for his time, etc., but 
the representation itself is not infected with the temptation to use confidential info.  See Samuel Issacharoff, 
Legal Responses to Conflicts of Interest, Chp.13 in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 
IN BUSINESS, LAW, MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 191 (Moore, Cain, Loewenstein, Bazerman, eds., 
2005) (noting that law is most concerned with conflicts infected by self-interest.)    
125 See Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 509-510. 
126 See Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 484-5 for more examples. 
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difficult to detect.  Where the arguments are not in direct conflict, it will be hard to show 
a positional conflict of interest.127 Thus, the more serious threat to disinterested 
representation is business conflicts in general, not positional conflicts per se. 
 
A business conflict between clients is not usually a disqualifying conflict of interest, nor 
should it be. A business conflict is defined as “the risk of loss of business from having a 
firm member be perceived to adopt a [] position that one of the firm’s clients might not 
like.”128 In our capitalist system, lawyers are expected to face and overcome economic 
pressures to the extent they must provide disinterested and competent representation to all 
clients. The rules do not require lawyers to avoid business conflicts,129 but lawyers are 
expected not to let such economic pressure actually materially impair representation.    
 
Nevertheless, research has shown the strength of these business conflicts in suppressing 
positional conflicts.  Attorneys in larger firms face significant pressure from clients not to 
undertake cases that go against their interests, even if unrelated to their representation by 
the firm.130 As one large firm lawyer put it, “We know what side our bread is buttered on, 
and we stay there.”131 This pressure is particularly strong when it comes to considering 
pro bono representation that might conflict with the interests of paying clients, and the 
pressure may come from other lawyers in the firm who simply fear alienating important 
clients. 132 
127 See, e.g., Advanced Display Systems, Inc. v. Kent State University, 2001 WL 1524433 at 6 (N.D. Tex. 
11/29/2001) (unpublished) (denying disqualification motion where attorney could reconcile potentially 
conflicting arguments about corporate alter ego doctrine). 
128 See Gordon, supra note 19. 
129 The rules do restrict the economic stake an attorney can have in a case, and limit business transactions 
with clients. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7.  But the rules do not forbid the kind of economic 
pressure a lawyer will feel from wanting to keep or attract business.  
130 Shapiro, supra note 20, at 1167. Using the term “positional conflict” to mean simply clients with 
differing interests, the author writes : “Positional conflicts are world class business conflicts, especially 
when the positions in contention are deeply held by large, powerful, repeat-playing institutions—the staple 
of large law firms.  Again, the difficulties engendered by positional conflicts are rarely legal ones; they are 
about business, client relations, and intra-firm politics, about how to serve the needs of important clients 
without undermining or alienating others.” Id.
131 Spaulding, infra note 159, at 1409. 
132 Id., generally. In another survey, “One question asked attorneys how their organizations dealt with matters 
that might prove objectionable to clients, other lawyers, or the community. Another question asked how satisfied 
attorneys were with the types of cases that were permitted. A relatively small number of lawyers answered these 
questions. Of those who did, about two-fifths were in organizations that discouraged work likely to advance 
positions inconsistent with client interests or values.” Deborah Rhodes, Pro Bono in Principle and Practice, 53 J. 
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Lawyers will tend to conform their conduct to their own business interests, which are the 
same as those of their valuable clients.  This conformity in many instances will be almost 
unthinking and automatic. Psychological research shows that when a person’s self-
interest is involved in a decision, the self-interest operates automatically and outside of 
conscious awareness to cause the person to prefer a certain course of action.  Conscious 
reason then rationalizes this choice.133 Such research supports the hypothesis that lawyers 
faced with potential positional conflicts will find a way to avoid them without much 
agonizing by reframing arguments or refusing representation.134 The positional conflict 
will never materialize, and the lawyer’s business interest in one or both clients is 
maintained.  
 
If business conflicts, and the lawyer’s own self-interest in maintaining valuable clients 
are more prevalent than true legal positional conflicts, a rule against positional conflicts 
becomes at best another rationalization that supports the operation of the business 
conflict.  (We see this rationalization even in the confusion of the terms: many lawyers 
seem to use the term “positional conflict” to mean simply a business conflict). 135 At 
worst, the mere possibility of a positional conflict becomes a reason to tailor, curtail or 
refuse representation, all in the service of the lawyer’s economic interests. An over-
emphasis on avoiding positional conflicts thus creates another incentive to behave in 
ways that favor powerful clients at the expense of less powerful clients.  
 
Of course, it is possible that where a lawyer has a positional conflict, together with a 
business reason to favor one client over the other, a true conflict of interest may arise. 
Where the attorney retains both cases despite a significant business conflict the danger is 
that the attorney will soft-pedal the arguments in the less-favored case, or engineer the 
timing of arguments so that favored case is decided first, lessening the chance of adverse 
 
OF LEGAL EDUC. 413, 452-3 (2003).  See also Gordon, supra note 19, arguing that market forces cause law firms 
to prohibit their lawyers from pro bono or other activities that could be perceived as adopting a policy position 
that a client might not like. 
133 Don A. Moore and George Loewenstein, Self-Interest, Automaticity, and the Psychology of Conflict of 
Interest, 17 SOC. JUSTICE RES., 189, 190-991 (2004). 
134 See discussion of Matthew Hale Carpenter, supra part I. 
135 See N.Y. TIMES, supra note 21; Ringel, supra note 23. 
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precedent from the disfavored case, but potentially creating adverse precedent for the 
disfavored case.136 But attorneys face conflicting business incentives all the time—in 
determining which cases to prioritize, how much time to put into a case, etc.  Ironically, 
where a business conflict and a positional conflict co-exist, it may actually mean that the 
business conflict has been overcome to the extent that the positional conflict has not been 
suppressed.  Senator Matthew Hale Carpenter’s 1872 positional conflict is an example of 
an attorney arguing a pro bono case in a way that undermined the arguments he made for 
his paying client.137 
Thus, while business conflicts are pervasive and powerful, an overly fastidious 
attention to business conflicts may lead to even greater specialization and client 
identification, decreasing lawyer independence and the general availability of 
legal services to unpopular or poorly paying clients.    
 
B. Risk of Adverse Precedent is Not Conflict of Interest 
If the lawyer has no business reason to favor one client over the other, a positional 
conflict is not a conflict of interest but rather an indication that there is no conflict 
preventing the attorney from making the contrary arguments.  Yet, the ABA comments 
and much of the other authority on positional conflicts state that a positional conflict will 
rise to the level of a prohibited conflict of interest if there is a significant risk that a 
“decision favoring one client will create a precedent likely to seriously weaken the 
position taken on behalf of the other client.”138 These authorities reason that where a 
lawyer’s argument is meant to create precedent favorable to one client but adverse to 
another, the “representation of [the second] client will be materially limited by the 
lawyer’s responsibilities to another client,” in violation of Model Rule 1.7.  
 
It is not clear how the risk of creating adverse precedent materially limits representation 
of another client.  One might argue that the creation of adverse precedent does not really 
demonstrate a conflict of interest because the precedent would have been created 
 
136 Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 488. 
137 Bradwell, supra note 6. 
138 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 24. 
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regardless of who made the arguments. “It is for the court to sort out and apply the 
correct legal principles.  That being so, the involvement of a single lawyer on both sides 
of an issue is no different from two lawyers who argue two different sides before the 
same tribunal.”139 Of course, such a conclusion requires us to assume that all lawyers are 
equally competent.140 A disparity in legal resources and lawyering skills might mean that 
the potential of creating adverse precedent should be a greater concern for the better or 
well-funded lawyer.  If a particularly good lawyer works on both sides of a legal issue 
equally well, that lawyer runs a risk of creating adverse precedent that would not have 
been suggested by a less competent lawyer. That might be a practical reason for a client 
to oppose a positional conflict, but is it an ethical problem?   
 
The rules of  professional responsibility are usually blind to economic or skill 
disparities.141 We have yet to condition the operation of the ethical rules on the resources 
of individual clients and lawyers, usually assuming that all lawyers are equally competent 
and that alternative counsel is always available, although it is clear these assumptions are 
not empirically valid. 142 In any event, the varying skill levels of attorneys is unrelated to 
the harm a positional conflict rule is directed at: the rule is not to ensure skilled 
representation, but to prevent a lawyer from working against the client’s interest.   
 
More importantly, while lawyers certainly have a hand in shaping the law, ultimately it is 
not the lawyer who “causes” the precedent, but the court that issues it.  The authorities 
agree that adverse precedent resulting from an earlier representation does not create a 
conflict of interest, nor does adverse precedent that might result from a concurrent 
 
139 Walther, supra note 46, at 139. 
140 Dzienkowski refutes this argument with the observation that the lawyer can to some extent control the 
timing of the decision by making or forgoing motions, and that “the strength of the facts and the lawyer’s 
persuasiveness in the first case to be decided may significantly influence the second representation.” 
Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 488.  But Dzienkowski’s refutation seems to rely on the workings of a 
business or other conflict to influence a lawyer to favor one case over the other. If there is really no 
business conflict between the two cases, then theoretically it should make no difference to the outcome of 
the cases whether one or two lawyers or firms make the contradictory arguments—if we assume that all 
lawyers are equally skilled. 
141 Fred Z. Zacharias, Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 
ARIZ. L.REV. 829, 838 (2002), noting “fictions of symmetry” in the Model Rules, including the fiction that 
all lawyers are equally competent.  
142 See, e.g., Walther, supra note 46, at 139: “Assuming equal competence, neither client is more harmed 
by a single lawyer arguing a conflicting position than by two lawyers doing so.” 
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representation in another (unpersuasive) jurisdiction.143 It is difficult to see how the risk 
of creating adverse precedent in one case really “materially limits” the representation,
although the precedent may certainly negatively affect the second client—especially if 
the creation of adverse precedent before the representation does not materially limit it.144 
The real problem with a representation that may lead to adverse precedent for another 
client—regardless of whether it is in the trial or appellate court—is one of credibility.  
The client, and perhaps the public, will understandably be upset to learn that her lawyer 
has been working successfully against her interests.  A client is entitled to know that the 
risk of such precedent exists—more as a matter of courtesy than anything else.145 The 
mere fact that a lawyer’s legal argument in one case might lead to precedent adverse to 
another client does not create a conflict of interest where one otherwise would not exist.  
 
C. Credibility concerns 
Even if a pure legal positional conflict is not by itself a conflict of interest, and even if the 
greater problem is business conflicts, a positional conflict creates problems of credibility.  
While these concerns do not rise to the level of an ethical violation, a lawyer arguing out 
of both sides of her mouth may have credibility issues with her client, the court and the 
public at large. How we evaluate these credibility problems turns on our ideal of law 
practice and whether we value more greatly lawyer independence from or loyalty to 
clients. An ethics code that clearly allowed positional conflicts would do much to reduce 
 
143 See section III, supra.
144 A less frequently mentioned risk in positional conflicts is the danger that the lawyer will be doing the 
opponent’s legal work Dzienkowski discusses the danger of sending opposing arguments out into “the 
public domain.” Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 490.  He notes this is more of a problem when there is a 
great difference in legal resources—i.e. when the positionally conflicted lawyer is particularly well-funded 
or good.  An opponent who discovers these public arguments from another case will realize an advantage 
he or she would not otherwise have had. The growth of the internet since Dzienkowski originally made this 
point in 1993 has significantly increased the likelihood that one’s opponent will have easy access to all 
one’s publicly submitted documents.  
 Most discussions of positional conflicts assume that the law and arguments about the law are equally 
accessible to all lawyers.  In real life, of course, there can be great disparities in legal resources and the 
quality of lawyering.  If these disparities exist, an opponent’s discovery of an attorney’s contrary arguments 
in another case my not only allow the opponent to question the attorney’s credibility, but also provide the 
opponent with arguments and briefing the opponent would not otherwise have developed. 
145 California Ethics Opinion No. 1989-208 at 4 
41
these credibility problems, but some credibility concerns would remain even for the 
fiercest advocate of lawyer independence.  
 
Both loyalty and independence can be portrayed as virtues or vices:  loyalty to the 
downtrodden but deserving client is a virtue, but loyalty to the soulless corporation in its 
quest to avoid just compensation is “selling out.” A lawyer like Atticus Finch who has the 
independence to represent with honor disparate interests in the same community is 
virtuous146; a lawyer who will represent any side of a question as long as he is paid is 
merely an unprincipled hired gun. 
 
Commentators who come down more on the side of enforcing client loyalty tend to urge 
recognition of positional conflicts.  Dzienkowski, who wrote a seminal article on 
positional conflicts, recommended that the Model Rules be amended to suggest analyzing 
positional conflicts in light of several factors similar to those eventually adopted in the 
1993 ABA ethics opinion and Restatement.147 Professor Dzienkowski  believed that 
material positional conflicts violate client expectations of loyalty and damage the legal 
profession in the eyes of the public.  Others have echoed these concerns.148 
Others, particularly those concerned about the availability of  lawyers for pro bono work, 
emphasize the need for attorney independence from powerful clients. To these 
commentators, an ethical prohibition of positional conflicts would exacerbate the 
difficulty legal services organizations already face in trying to recruit lawyers to take on 
cases that may go against the business or political interests of their important clients.149 In 
their view, clients already exert too much power over their attorneys.  
 
146 While Atticus seemed willing to represent various interests—the wrongly accused black man as well as 
some of the poor whites who wanted to hang him—one suspects that he would not have pursued a 
dishonorable goal for his clients. See HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960). 
147 Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 529.   
148 J. Vincent Aprile, II, Positional Conflicts and Criminal Justice Litigators, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Winter 
2000) 56, 58.  Aprile was really more concerned with the detrimental effect such a conflict would have on 
the representation itself by undercutting credibility. But he also believed that public defenders should not 
have positional conflicts imputed to their entire firm. 
149 Spaulding infra note 159.  Dzienkowski also recognized the pro bono problem, supporting a positional 
conflict exception for law reform activities, but stopped short of an exception for litigation.  Dzienkowski, 
supra note 13, at 461. 
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Obviously, not all clients have this kind of power. Lawyers whose client base is primarily 
individuals (“Personal plight cases”150) may be quite independent from the clients. 
Clients—such as indigent criminal defendants, legal services clients, or insureds—whose 
legal bills are paid by others may also have very little leverage over their attorneys.   
 
Related to the tension between loyalty and independence is a more fundamental question 
about the nature of the lawyer’s work: should lawyers mean what they say, or is it 
honorable to make arguments simply because they serve the client’s cause?151 This 
question also is important to the concerns raised about the lawyer’s credibility in the 
context of positional conflicts: if lawyers are hired guns, why does it undermine their 
credibility to take conflicting legal positions? On the other hand, does an attorney enjoy 
more or less credibility if she is clearly identified with one kind of client? 
 
In thinking about the question of attorney sincerity, it is helpful to imagine the two 
extremes of practice: the hired gun (or, more positively, the taxi cab driver) who will 
argue anything within the bounds of the law and ethical rules, and the “true believer,”152 
always convinced of the righteousness of his or her position.  
 
The hired gun or taxicab is more in line with the traditional professional ideal.  The 
ethical canons emphasized, “The obligation of loyalty to the client applies only to a 
lawyer in the discharge of professional duties and implies no obligation to adopt a 
 
150 “Personal plight” cases have been defined as criminal defense, personal injury plaintiffs work and 
divorce. John P. Heinz, Edward O. Laumann, Robert L. Nelson, & Ethan Michelson, The Changing 
Character of Lawyers’ Work, 32 Law and Society Rev. 751, 760 (1998).   
151 This recurring debate surfaced again with the nomination of Judge John Roberts to the Supreme Court.  
See Anne E. Kornblut, Week in Review, The Nation: Judging John Roberts; The Briefcase Carries Briefs, 
Not Necessarily Ideologies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2005, § 4, at 5 (discussing whether lawyers should be 
held accountable for the positions they advocate on behalf of clients). 
152 “True Believer” was also the name of a 1989 movie about a former civil rights lawyer who ended up 
defending drug dealers.  TRUE BELIEVER (Columbia Pictures, 1989).  See also Carl M. Selinger,
Dramatizing on Film the Uneasy Role of the American Criminal Defense Lawyer:  True Believer, 22 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV 223 (1997). When I practiced criminal defense law this term was frequently used to 
describe dedicated defense attorneys who were always completely convinced of the correctness of opposing 
the prosecution, and contrasted to those more agnostic attorneys who could often see the merits of their 
opponents’ position.  
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personal viewpoint favorable to the interests or desires of the client.”153 This view has 
been repeated in the Restatement,154 and Model Rules. Independence and detachment 
from client causes are part of the character of the honorable lawyer put forth by Chief 
Justice Roberts at his confirmation hearings.155 
The hired gun attorney certainly has his critics. Richard Wasserstrom has criticized the 
lawyer’s role differentiated morality and specifically the practice of arguing positions in 
which the lawyer does not believe: “If the lawyer does not in fact believe what is urged 
by way of argument, if the lawyer is only playing a role, then it appears to be proper to 
tax the lawyer with hypocrisy and insincerity.  To be sure, actors in a play take on roles 
and say things that the characters, not the actors, believe.  But we know it is a play and 
that they are actors.  The law courts are not, however, theaters, and the lawyers both talk 
about justice and they genuinely seek to persuade.  The fact that the lawyer’s words, 
thoughts, and convictions are, apparently, for sale and at the service of the client helps us, 
I think, to understand the peculiar hostility which is more than occasionally uniquely 
directed by lay persons toward lawyers.”156 Wasserstrom argues that the lawyer pays a 
heavy price for living this way. 
 
At the other end of the continuum from the hired gun, the “true believer” identifies 
strongly with the client’s cause. Some true believers are motivated by pre-existing 
political beliefs.157 Others may come to identify with their clients as a result of 
representing them over time.  In the end the lawyer who began as a hired gun persuades 
 
153 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-17 (1980) 
154 “Moreover, it is a tradition that a lawyer’s advocacy for a client should not be construed as an 
expression of the lawyer’s personal views.” Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, § 125, cmt. e 
(2005).   
155 See note 3, supra.
156 Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 Human Rights, 1-15 (1975), 
reprinted in THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 159 (Geoffrey Hazard and 
Deborah L. Rhode, 3d ed., 1994). 
157 Legal services lawyers, for example, may be drawn to their jobs by their strong beliefs in social justice.  
Once there, a true believer will take on an identity and “mission” to which their arguments must conform. 
See Peter Margulies, Multiple Communities or Monolithic Clients:  Positional Conflicts of Interest and the 
Mission of the Legal Services Lawyer, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2339 (1999).  “Cause lawyers” are “activist 
lawyers who use the law as a means of creating social change in addition to a means of helping individual 
clients…The worry for the cause lawyer is that the pursuit of her ‘cause’ may at times conflict with her 
client’s interest.” Margareth Etienne, The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical Examination of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers as Cause Lawyers, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1195 (2005). 
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him or herself of the client’s position.  As one commentator suggests, “one way that 
lawyers deal with the problem of opportunism is to come to believe in the arguments they 
make on behalf of their clients.  For example, defenders of tobacco companies may come 
to believe that the hazards of smoking really have not been demonstrated sufficiently.”158 
Another observer suggests that many lawyers “do not perceive any disjunction between 
personal morality and professional identity . . . .Such lawyers may improperly discount 
their professional obligations to third parties by so closely identifying with their clients’ 
ends and interests.”159 
Although the “true believer” is sincere—unlike the hired gun—she can also be perceived 
as a menace because she lacks detachment and professionalism. Writing in opposition to 
the 2000 changes to the Model Rule comments on positional conflicts, a family law 
lawyer and judge claimed that positional conflicts rules would “deprive the court, and the 
legal system, of the objectivity that the representation of both classes of parties provides 
in this particularly emotion-laden field . . . Lawyers will undoubtedly do a better job of 
dispute resolution if they do not practice or model polarized thinking, which, after all, is 
recognized in mental health circles to be a thought disorder.”160 
Rather than advocating the ethics of a true believer, many writers defend the lawyer’s 
role-differentiated ethics of argument.161 Yet they also acknowledge the accusations of 
 
158 J. M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869, 887 n.24 (1993).  
He goes on to say, “Of course, this is a solution to the problem of opportunism only if one believes that 
reduction of cognitive dissonance by itself counts as a solution.  Moreover, it cannot serve as a solution for 
the lawyer who continually represents clients with contradictory interests.  Such a lawyer is more likely to 
come to believe in the process rather than the client—that zealous representation of whatever client is 
before her is adequate justification for her actions.  The repeated experience of being a hired gun causes her 
to believe in the propriety of being a hired gun.” 
159 Norman W. Spaulding, The Prophet and the Bureaucrat: Positional conflicts in Service Pro Bono 
Publico, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1395, 1429 (1998); Karl Llewellyn, too, noted the ease with which lawyers 
come to believe in the justness of their clients’ causes, especially when the clients’ cases are particularly 
profitable.  KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 178 (Oceana, 1930).         
160 Walther, supra note 46, at 138. 
161 Note Hazard, supra note 54 at § 10.10, illustration 10-2, discussion of a positional conflict before the 
same judge: “Although some might say that the spectacle of the same lawyer arguing both sides of the 
same proposition damages the image of the legal profession, it can also be said that it instead shows the 
profession at its best. So long as there are non-frivolous arguments to be made, lawyers should be proud to 
acknowledge that as detached professionals they are capable of asserting either side.”  With respect to legal 
education, Anthony Kronman defends the case method as teaching students to entertain multiple positions, 
“strengthening their moral imagination and encouraging them to take a more cosmopolitan view of the 
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dishonesty that will not go away. James Boyd White has written an eloquent defense of 
the advocate who does not necessarily endorse his client’s cause.162 In a dialogue based 
on Plato’s Georgias, the lawyers’ defender states that while he may be “insincere” in a 
certain sense when making an argument, he is nevertheless honest because the judges and 
other advocates understand his role.  He argues that he acts with integrity because his 
implicit and honest statement is that this is the best argument he can make for his client 
given his resources.163 At the same time, White gives voice to the contrary argument that 
a lawyer is little better than a prostitute who serves neither his client’s best interests nor 
justice. (218-219). Geoffrey Hazard writes that while it is “profoundly unattractive” to 
admit that the advocate’s presentation is a theatrical enterprise rather than the lawyer’s 
honest assessment of the case, requiring lawyers to take on the truth finding function of 
the judge would not result in justice.164 Yet he acknowledges that many involved are 
unhappy with the theatrical role-playing:  “The judges are unhappy knowing that the best 
they can get is verisimilitude. . . .Many lay critics and some academicians condemn both 
the advocates’ artifice and the artificers, without coming to terms with the fundamental 
difficulty that begets the role of advocate in the first place.” 165 These comments reflect a 
widespread discomfort with the adversarial process to which we are nevertheless 
committed.   
 
On the spectrum between hired gun and true believer, most lawyers probably fall 
somewhere in the middle or travel between the poles.  Most advocates acknowledge the 
importance of demonstrating a belief in one’s case in order to be persuasive. 166 Yet 
several also warn against the danger of becoming too closely identified with the case: 
“Once a lawyer starts crusading, he loses the objectivity he needs, he begins to slop over, 
 
diversity of human goods . . .” ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 160 (1993).  He notes that 
many students experience this education as unmooring them from their former ideals. Id.
162 JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 215-237 
(1985). 
163 Id. at 225. 
164 Geoffery C. Hazard, Jr., Law Practice and the Limits of Moral Philosophy, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE 83, 
(Deborah L. Rhode, ed., 2000). 
165 Id., at 83. 
166 GERRY SPENCE, HOW TO ARGUE AND WIN EVERY TIME 58-59 (1995); DAVID C. FREDERICK, THE ART 
OF ORAL ADVOCACY 33 (2003); FREDERICK BERNAYS WEINER, BRIEFING AND ARGUING FEDERAL 
APPEALS 359 (1967). 
46
he rapidly diminishes his effectiveness, and he becomes that stock, hackneyed and yet 
constantly reappearing character, the lawyer who represents himself and who in 
consequence has a fool for a client.”167 When advocates discuss the need to have a belief 
in the correctness of one’s case, they often discuss how to induce this belief through 
preparation.168 The “sincere belief” of the advocate comes to resemble the sincere beliefs 
that an actor conveys after similar preparation. 
 
Thus, there is far from unanimity on the proper attitude of the attorney toward the 
sincerity of his or her position. Karl Llewellyn has suggested that there is no agreement 
on the proper attitude because all lawyers are sometimes happy with the hired gun ethic 
and sometimes earnest believers in their clients’ causes.  He told law students in his 1930 
lecture, that the two ethical norms are “completely respectable, accepted, impeccable, and 
either of which is always available,” depending on which appears convenient to the 
lawyer at the time.169 This ambivalence makes it difficult to develop a clear rule for 
lawyer credibility with positional conflicts, and may help explain the varying approaches 
taken by different jurisdictions.  Nevertheless, a positional conflict will raise credibility 
questions even for the staunchest defenders of the hired gun or taxicab ethic. These 
problems will arise with three principle audiences:  the court(s), clients, and the public. 
 
The Court.  “[T]he most important object of inquiry in a study of persuasion is not the 
author but the audience to whom the argument is addressed.  After all, those who make 
arguments, whether manipulatively or with conviction, do so in order to influence 
others.” 170 Judges well understand that lawyers are not necessarily arguing in accord 
with their personal opinions when they take a position in court.  At least one bar ethics 
opinion declined to find that appellate judges would be prejudiced against either side 
when presented with opposing arguments by the same firm: “Appellate judges are 
presumably trained to recognize that advocates are often required to take positions 
contrary to those previously taken by their partners, when the interests of a client so 
 
167 Weiner, supra note 166, at 357. 
168 Spence, supra note 166; Frederick, supra note 166, at 34; Weiner, supra note 166.  
169 Llewellyn, supra note 159, at 180. 
170 Jerry Frug, Argument as Character, 40 STAN. L. REV. 869, 881 (1988) 
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require.”171 Hazard and Hodes, by defending the ethics of a pure legal positional conflict 
before the same judge, also seem to assume that the advocate’s credibility will not suffer 
with the court.172 
But several authorities and commentators state the opposite: that consciously or 
subconsciously, judges will question the credibility of an advocate who makes contrary 
legal arguments before the same tribunal.173 Other sources, while they do not expressly 
comment on a loss of credibility before the court, seem to assume such a problem when 
they draw the ethical line at presenting opposing arguments in the same court.174 
Could any credibility problem from a positional conflict be eliminated by mutual 
agreement between bench and bar that a positional conflict poses no ethical concern?  
That is, if we all agreed that lawyers should be allowed to argue contrary positions—even 
in the same court—would judges adopt Hazard’s position that to argue contrary positions 
actually shows the profession in its noblest light?  It is unlikely that the profession could 
get rid of the entire credibility problem in this way.175 The practice of law is not like a 
moot court competition or debate round.  Judges in real cases are trying to decide what is 
right—it is a serious enterprise, “take[ing] place in a field of pain and death.”176 Given 
the seriousness of the enterprise, most judges will (unconsciously or not) prefer lawyers 
who at least appear to also be serious as well. Nevertheless, if there were mutual 
agreement, as apparently existed in the Nineteenth Century, it could greatly diminish the 
credibility problems associated with a positional conflict.  
171 Arizona Ethics Opinion No. 87-15 (1987). 
172 Hazard, supra note 54, at 10-33. 
173 ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-377 (1993); Dzienkowski, supra note 
13, at 489-90; Aprile, supra note 138 at 58.. 
174 See Part III (C), supra.
175 In an article criticizing the rule against lawyers vouching for clients, Thomas L. Shaffer argues that 
modern American lawyers have attempted unsuccessfully to take the character of the advocate out of 
advocacy, mostly in order to prevent the  inconvenient consequences of vouching on lawyer’s careers.  
These consequences include that lawyers would have to vouch in every case or the courts would wonder at 
the absence of  vouching, and that lawyers who were not known in the community would have a 
disadvantage. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Profession’s Rule Against Vouching for Clients: Advocacy 
and “The Manner That is The Man Himself”, 7 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS AND PUB. POL’Y 145, 158-
59(1993). Shaffer argues that it is impossible to remove the influence of the advocate’s character. 
176 Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). 
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Some credibility problem will remain, however, because of the importance of ethos or 
character in argument. While “[t]he daily experience of using arguments and 
counterarguments interchangeably gives lawyers and judges such a distant (sometimes 
cynical) attitude toward arguments that their arguments often seem characterless,” 177 
character is nevertheless important.178 As Aristotle wrote, “Persuasion is achieved by the 
speaker’s personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him 
credible.  We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true 
generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is 
impossible and opinions are divided.”179 An effective argument causes the listener or 
reader to identify with the character of the advocate.180 If the character of the advocate is 
that of a chameleon who can argue two sides of the same question, how will that 
character help persuade the decision-maker? To the extent argument is based on a 
particular type of character (champion of entrepreneur, defender of the little guy) can 
these two types be credibly represented by same person or same firm?  Is it too much to 
ask the       court to see it as a performance? Is not the very two-facedness of the 
positional conflict revealing of a bad character?181 
When discussing an advocate’s character, one might refer to character in a number of 
senses: reputational character the advocate brings with herself, the character of the 
advocate revealed through the argument, and the character of the argument itself.  The 
lines between these different kinds of character will not always be clear, and character 
itself can be multidimensional and always changing. (frug)  Reputational character might 
include such things as the speaker’s background, education, and firm association.  Justice 
Blackmun’s notes on oral arguments demonstrate that this kind of character could 
 
177 Frug, supra note 170, at 896. 
178 Frug, supra note 170; Amanda Anderson, The Way We Argue Now (2006) 
179 ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 7 (W. Rhys Roberts, trans., 2004). 
180 Frug, supra note 170. 
181 By several accounts, the Solicitor General and his attorneys have the highest credibility as advocates 
before the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Rebecca Deen & Joseph Ignagni, Individual Justices and the Solicitor 
General: The Amicus Curiae Cases, 1953-2000, 89 Judicature 68, 69 (2005); Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? 
Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & Pol. 33, 47 (2004). One important 
reason for that credibility is probably that the Solicitor General’s positions are the considered positions of 
the executive branch, and not paid for by private actors. (Of course, some will argue that these positions are 
influenced by powerful private interests). The Solicitor General’s office cannot have a positional conflict 
because it has only one client. 
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definitely influence his assessment of credibility.182 But the argument itself, as Aristotle 
noted, will also reveal character. Even the most stellar reputation and background will not 
make up for an argument that is churlish, sullen or disrespectful.  Finally, the terms of the 
argument itself may appeal to a certain kind of character: authoritarian, vengeful, 
merciful, etc. A positional conflict will not necessarily diminish the lawyer’s 
performance of character in all of these senses, but it might affect the court’s acceptance 
of that performance. 
 
No matter what one’s position on whether a good lawyer must believe what she says, the 
sense of commitment is an important asset for an advocate.  Judges committed to an ethic 
of independence can ignore positional conflicts up to a point, but the advocate’s 
credibility will suffer –or at least the advocate will lose a strategic asset—if judge is 
faced with the same lawyer arguing opposing positions.  To a lesser extent this might also 
be true if two lawyers from the same firm take opposing positions.183 
Yet, while these credibility problems can never be completely eliminated, removing the 
ethical rule against positional conflicts could reduce them greatly.  If the profession were 
to unequivocally endorse the character of the taxi-driver, the honest advocate, as it did 
 
182 See generally Linda Greenhouse, Becoming Justice Blackmunm, (2005), showing that Blackmun graded 
oral argument performances. Political scientists who have analyzed his grades show a strong connection 
between the advocate’s social status (background, education, status of employer) and Blackmun’s grade.  
Timothy R. Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck , James F. Spriggs, II , Legal Argumentation before the U.S. 
Supreme Court, at 29-30. Paper prepared for presentation at the 2004 annual meetings of the American 
Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, September 2-5. One reason for this reputational advantage 
might be that advocates who went to Ivy League schools and practiced with large Washington firms were 
more like the justices themselves and therefore easier for the justices to identify with. Frug, supra note 172 
(on the importance of identifying with the speaker).  
183 Given the importance of credibility to advocacy, should the impairment to credibility caused by a 
positional conflict be analyzed as a threat to lawyer competence?  In some ways competency seems like a 
better analysis than conflict of interest because the problems with credibility are strategic. But competency 
refers to “the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation,” MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2004), and it would seem to be a stretch to 
include credibility within that definition.  See California Ethics Opinion No. 1989-108 (rejecting argument 
that positional conflict violates competency rule) and Maine Ethics Opinion No. 155 (1997) (finding no per 
se conflict of interest from a positional conflict, but suggesting that a contemporaneous positional conflict 
before the same court could impair the lawyer’s effectiveness to the extent that it would violate the duty to 
employ “reasonable care and skill.” 
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more fully in Senator Carpenter’s time, the credibility problems associated with 
positional conflicts would lessen.  
 
The Client. A client is unlikely to understand why he or she should tolerate a positional 
conflict, especially in the same court. Perhaps some clients can be made to understand the 
value of an independent bar, but most will want a lawyer who is not at cross-purposes 
with their case.  To a client, a lawyer with a positional conflict will seem not be an 
entirely loyal advocate.   
 
Given this credibility problem with clients, do clients even need to be told about 
positional conflicts?  If a positional conflict is not a real conflict of interest, as I’ve 
argued, then there is no ethical requirement under the Model Rules that clients be told 
about it. But as a practical matter, and as a courtesy to clients, it is good policy to inform 
clients of significant positional conflicts, especially those that a client will likely discover 
in any event, such as those where a victory for one client will result in adverse precedent 
for the other.  The California Ethics committee opinion suggests that there might even be 
malpractice liability if harm to the client “might have been avoided by timely disclosure” 
of the positional conflict.184 
The Public.  Lawyers already have significant credibility problems with the public, and 
many lawyer jokes seem based on the lawyer’s lack of honesty.185 The negative effect of 
even a factual positional conflict was a primary concern of the court in Estates Theatres, 
Inc., v. Columbia Pictures Indus.186 The public is not impressed with the ethic of 
“independence” when lawyers talk out of both sides of their mouths.187 
184 California Ethics Opinion 1989-108 at  4. 
185 E.g., Q: How can you tell when a lawyer is lying?  A: His lips are moving. Q: What happens when a 
lawyer dies? A: He lies still. 
186 See note 53, supra.
187 For example, when the well-known lawyer Edward Bennett Williams made one characterization of this 
client’s sentence to the court and another to the press, one reporter wrote in disgust, “Words for hire.  
Words not for expression but for manipulation. Words that do not emanate from some deep and honest 
center of a man, but rather from a bag of tricks well learned.” Jack Fuller, Words for hire add a disturbing 
note to the Helms case, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 13, 1977 (quoted in Robert Pack, Edward Bennett Williams for 
the Defense, 37 (1983)). 
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The Lawyer’s self-respect (credibility with self). Although many lawyers and bar 
associations have shown themselves reluctant to adopt a strict rule against positional 
conflicts, few attorneys would probably feel comfortable presenting starkly conflicting 
arguments, especially to the same court. Lawyers will differ on the level of discomfort, 
just as commentators differ on whether sincerity is important to the lawyer’s work.  But 
for many lawyers, if the positional conflict involves an issue important to the case, it will 
be difficult to achieve that state of “sincere belief” that many say is necessary for 
effective advocacy.188 
Not only would a positional conflict make adequate preparation difficult for most 
lawyers, but it would be demoralizing for many to have their opportunism so starkly 
exposed.  Most lawyers prefer to align their economic interests with their pocketbooks, as 
Llewelleyn said, and come to believe in the rightness of their cases.  That belief will be 
difficult with a positional conflict, unless one comes to believe in the rightness of the 
being a hired gun or taxicab.189 
Where a positional conflict is imputed between firm members, rather than with a single 
lawyer, the problem of credibility with the lawyer self disappears in most instances.   
 
D. An Example:  the Public Defender 
 
It may be helpful to take a particular case of a positional conflict in advocacy to 
understand how a positional conflict might work. The recent Delaware case, Williams v. 
State,190 provides a good example. The positional conflict in that case was apparently a 
stark legal one. The court described the conflict as follows: 
[The lawyer] asserts that, on appeal, Williams could raise an arguable 
issue that the Superior Court erred when it concluded it was required to 
give “great weight” to the jury's 10-2 recommendation in favor of the 
death penalty for Williams. [The lawyer] contends, however, that he may 
 
188 Weiner, supra note 166; Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., v. United States, supra note101, at 30. 
189 Roberts, Confirmation Hearings, supra note 3. 
190 805 A.2d 880 (Del. 2002). 
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have a conflict in presenting this argument because he has advocated a 
contrary position on behalf of a different client in another capital murder 
appeal pending before this Court. In Garden v. State, Nos. 125 & 162, 
2001, [the lawyer] argued in his opening brief that the Superior Court 
erred when it failed to give great weight to the jury's 2-10 vote rejecting 
the imposition of the death penalty for Garden. 
 
The lawyer in this case was a public defender who had no business conflict between the 
two capital clients.191 Neither case would be more profitable than the other; neither client 
paid for the representation. Thus the real concern in representing both clients was the 
lawyer’s credibility.  Along with the traditional concern with creating adverse precedent 
for one client, the lawyer cited concerns about his credibility with the court and his 
clients.192 
The credibility problem is especially acute for a public defender, whose credibility is 
somewhat tarnished to being with.  The public defender does not choose her cases, and 
there is a widespread impression—both with the public and many on the bench—that 
most of her clients are guilty. The ethical rules on attorney truthfulness and avoiding 
frivolous claims properly include exceptions for criminal defense counsel in light of the 
criminal defendant’s constitutional rights,193 and the danger to these rights if counsel 
became too concerned with avoiding frivolous arguments.  But one effect of relaxing 
rules for truthfulness and frivolity for criminal defense counsel is that the credibility of 
defense counsel may be undermined.  Courts may assume that an attorney is simply 
“going through the motions” in a particular case, regardless of whether the attorney is 
 
191 confirmed in interview with Bernard J. O’Donnell, supra note 101. 
192 “O'Donnell is concerned that his representation of both clients on this issue will create the risk that an 
unfavorable precedent will be created for one client or the other. O'Donnell also is concerned that it may 
invite questions about his credibility with this Court and his clients' perception of his loyalty to each of 
them.” 805 A.2d at 881. 
193 See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2004) (prohibiting frivolous claims and defenses, but 
allowing criminal defense lawyers to require proof of every element of a crime); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 3.3, cmt. 6-10 (2004) (discussing the different possible approaches for criminal defense 
counsel, as distinguished form other lawyers, when false evidence has been offered). 
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arguing in all sincerity.  Thus, a public defender cannot afford any additional credibility 
problem that a positional conflict might add.   
 
The public defender’s credibility with clients can also be strained since the client cannot 
choose or fire the attorney.  A dedicated public defender can overcome initial client 
skepticism by demonstrating her commitment and competence, but a positional conflict 
will certainly undermine those efforts.  
 
The pubic defender’s self-respect (credibility with herself) is also an important concern.  
The public defender does not choose her cases, and part of the ethic of public defense is 
the idea that everyone deserves constitutional due process and a good defense.  Most 
public defenders believe that their work is honorable, whether their clients are guilty or 
not.  They do not judge or turn down clients.  But to have a positional conflict forced 
upon them may be too much for this sense of honor and self-respect, especially if they 
believe it undermines their credibility with their audience and clients.   
 
In Williams, the state supported the attorney’s motion to withdraw, and the court allowed 
it. This was proper, and courts should grant such motions even were the state to oppose 
them.194 One reason to grant such motions is that although the credibility problem is very 
real for a public defender, the client(s) will have no way to challenge the positional 
conflict’s effect on their case.   Unlike paying criminal clients or civil clients, a public 
defense client cannot fire the attorney to prevent the positional conflict from 
materializing, even if the client comes to know of the problem in time. Nor will the client 
have any post-trial remedy.  A positional conflict will probably not rise to the level of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, despite the 
Delaware court’s statement that the attorney’s positional conflict “may compromise the 
effectiveness of his assistance as appellate counsel.”195 
194 The court in Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., v. United States Sentencing Commission also advised 
that public defenders who were uncomfortable with a positional conflict be allowed to withdraw. 680 
F.Supp. at 30. 
195 805 A.2d at 882. 
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To show a violation of the Sixth Amendment through ineffective assistance of counsel, 
the defendant must show (1) deficient performance, and (2) prejudice, that the outcome 
of the proceeding more probably than not would have been different.196 It is notoriously 
difficult to show ineffective assistance: convictions with drunk, sleeping, or unlicensed 
lawyers have all been upheld.197 Even if one could show that proceeding with a purely 
legal positional conflict was deficient performance—a difficult showing given the 
disagreement among authorities as to whether such a conflict is an ethical violation—it 
will be impossible to show prejudice in most cases.  If the prejudice claim is based on 
impaired credibility, courts will presume that judges are able to look past any credibility 
issue presented.198 If the claim of prejudice is based on the creation of adverse precedent, 
it will also be impossible to show that the court would have reached a different result had 
different counsel been representing each case. 
 
One might argue that a defendant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel based on a 
positional conflict should not have to show prejudice.  Where a claim of ineffective 
assistance is based on a conflict of interest adversely affecting performance, prejudice 
need not be shown.199 But with such claims the defendant must nevertheless show the 
adverse effect on performance.  Again, it will be difficult to show exactly how the 
conflict adversely affected the arguments made.200 
Because a later challenge to the conviction based on a positional conflict is unlikely to 
succeed, but the credibility impairment may be real, courts should grant appointed 
counsel motions to withdraw for positional conflicts. There is little danger of abuse: the 
 
196 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). 
197 See, e.g. Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001) (attorney sleeping in the courtroom); White v. 
State, 664 So.2d 242 (1995) (attorney inebriated and under the influence of narcotics); Smith v. Ylst, 826 
F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1987) (attorney suffering from mental illness); See also Jeffrey L. Kirchemeyer, Drink 
Drugs, and Drowsiness:  The Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland 
Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425 (1996).   
198 See Arizona Ethics Opinion No. 87-15 (1987). 
199 United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76 (2nd Cir. 2002) 
200 The defendant might show an adverse effect based on timing of arguments, delays that put one case 
ahead of the other, etc. See Dzienkowski, supra note 14. But where there are other explanations for the 
timing, it will be hard to show the effect of the conflict. If the defendant could show an economic reason 
for the lawyer to prefer one case over the other, and that the preference caused the timing decisions, he 
could perhaps show a conflict with the lawyer’s self-interest.  See Schwarz, supra note 199.  But absent 
such a conflict, he will have a tough time. 
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moving attorney would have to show the conflict to the court.  Direct legal positional 
conflicts, especially in the same court, are likely to be rare.  In addition, such conflicts 
need not be imputed. Because the chief concern is with the lawyer’s credibility, not with 
financial incentives or divided loyalties, public defenders from the same agency should 
be allowed to take contrary positions on legal questions.201 Thus the impact of a policy to 
grant such motions to withdraw should be minimal.   
For the same reasons that counsel’s motion to withdraw should be granted, public 
defenders should tell their clients about a positional conflict so that the client might also 
protest—an argument after the fact will be too late.  Because the positional conflict is not 
a true conflict of interest, the client therefore has no right under the ethics rules or the 
constitution to demand a lawyer without a positional conflict.  But if a client objects 
strenuously, the lawyer could move to withdraw in the interests of client relations, or a 
court might grant the client’s motion for substitution of counsel. 
 
Yet while such motions should be granted, it would not be advisable to make withdrawal 
mandatory where the attorney has a positional conflict.  Just as the rule against positional 
conflicts seems to have caused civil lawyers and firms to suppress such conflicts in 
various ways, a more rigid rule against positional conflicts even for public defenders 
might cause an abundance of caution that could deprive clients of good quality counsel.  
In many jurisdictions, the supply of good public defenders is limited, and conflict counsel 
might not always be of similar quality.202 The assumption behind the conflict of interest 
rules—that good lawyers are like busses203—is simply not warranted, especially for poor 
clients.204 
V. Proposal to Amend Model Rule 1.7 Comment 22 
 
201 Aprile, supra note 173, at 57.  “Indeed, when two individual public defenders are arguing contrary legal 
positions in separate cases, the integrity and independence of the defender agency is apparent.” 
202 ACLU OF WA REPORT ON INDIGENT DEFENSE, supra note 10. The report provides another reason not to 
require public defenders to withdraw for positional conflicts.  However ill-advised, it is not uncommon for 
public defense contracts to penalize the recognition of a conflict of interest so that the contractor must pay 
for any conflict counsel out of the contract fee.  Just as with private civil attorneys, with such contracts a 
rule against positional conflicts can create a financial reason to suppress the conflicting legal argument.  
203 . . .another one will be along in a few minutes. 
204 See criticisms of Fiandaca, supra note 93. 
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The current comment on positional conflicts, comment 22 to Model Rule 1.7, should be 
amended to say: 
 
“Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions on behalf of different clients.  
The mere fact that advocating a legal position on behalf of one client might create 
precedent adverse to the interests of a client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated 
matter does not create a conflict of interest.205 Regardless whether a lawyer actually 
takes inconsistent legal positions in different cases, if the legal arguments in unrelated 
cases are connected in such a way that a lawyer is under pressure to shape, modify or 
drop arguments in one case in light of the other case, the lawyer needs to assess whether 
there is a significant risk that the representation of either or both case[s] will be 
materially limited. Lawyers cannot always avoid such pressure in their practice, but they 
should not undertake representation that creates such pressure if they are unable to 
withstand it. 
 
“If a lawyer determines to argue contrary legal positions in unrelated cases, the lawyer 
should consider the credibility implications with respect to the court, clients, the public 
and the lawyer self.  Where the inconsistent positions involve issues important to the 
cases, and especially where the positions are advocated in the same jurisdiction, the 
prudent attorney will inform the affected clients. 
 
“Especially where it is a single attorney, rather than different attorneys in a firm, 
presenting contrary legal arguments, a court should grant an attorney’s motion to 
withdraw for credibility concerns.  But the attorney should not be required to withdraw.” 
 
This proposal would change the current comment in several important ways.  First, it 
removes the suggestion that a legal positional conflict by itself can be a conflict of 
interest in violation of the Model Rules.  Second, it would advise lawyers to consider the 
risk of material impairment of representation from reconciling, modifying or dropping 
 
205 This first sentence is in the current version of comment 22. 
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arguments in one case to please or keep another client. The current comment only advises 
lawyers to scrutinize positional conflicts—a faulty indicator of conflict of interest.  The 
proposal would also advise the lawyer to consider the credibility implications of a 
positional conflict, and to inform the clients where the arguments are sufficiently 
important and likely to affect credibility. The current comment does not address 
credibility.  Finally, the proposed comment advises that a lawyer’s request to withdraw 
because of credibility concerns should be respected, even though the lawyer cannot be 
required to withdraw as there should be no ethical prohibition against positional conflicts.   
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
It is not easy to craft a rule since the positional conflict sits astride a fault-line of 
fundamental ambivalence in law practice and theory about lawyer sincerity, loyalty and 
independence.  The absence of litigation about positional conflicts and the evidence of 
the much greater force of business conflicts suggests that a stronger prohibition of 
positional conflicts is not advisable. A positional conflict is actually a faulty indicator of 
a conflict of interest—the real harm is when a lawyer succumbs to pressure to drop or 
change arguments in one case in order not to harm another client or case.  But while a 
rule against positional conflicts is therefore counterproductive, counsel’s decision to 
withdraw in the face of a positional conflict should be respected 
 
Positional conflicts can raise credibility concerns for individual lawyers and firms, 
despite the widely held professional ideal of independence, an ideal that is consistent with 
lawyers arguing both sides of a legal issue in unrelated cases. Because of the importance 
of the advocate’s character or ethos to argument, a lawyer arguing both sides of a legal 
issue may present a diminished sense of commitment to the case—affecting credibility 
with the court, the clients and possibly the public. The example of the public defender, 
whose clients are powerless and who may not withdraw without court permission, 
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illustrates these credibility problems. While these credibility concerns do not rise to the 
level of ethical violations, the prudent lawyer will carefully consider them in determining 
whether to proceed with a positional conflict.   
 
